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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
"The prices of most farm products are highly 
variable. They change from year to year, from 
month to month, and from day to day. Some of them 
change from hour to hour, and even from minute to 
minute. 111 
The preceding quote emphasizes the variability of farm prices. 
With highly variable prices, the timing and methods of selling grain 
can be important influences on the net income of Iowa farmers. How-
ever, many grain producers either are not aware of all the available 
marketing alternatives or are not familiar enough with them to 
effectively manage price risks. Instead, they feel more comfortable 
selling in local cash markets at harvest or when income is needed 
later in the year, whether the price is satisfactory or not. 
As an example of recent price variability, Northwest Iowa soybean 
prices during the 1976-77 marketing year ranged from slightly under 
$6.00 per bushel in the fall to nearly $10.00 per bushel in late 
spring. Assume a Northwest Iowa producer raised 100 acres of soybeans 
in 1976 with an average yield of 33 bushels per acre. If the producer 
marketed all of his crop at the low price, the gross receipts would be 
$19,800. If, however, he had marketed his soybeans at the higher 
price his gross receipts would be $33,000, nearly twice the revenue 
of the low price. 
It is also important to realize that in some cases the season's 
1 
Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Agricultural Price Analysis, 3rd ed. (Ames: 
Iowa State College Press, 1950), p. 3. 
2 
high prices may occur when the producer is not ready to physically 
market his crop. For this reason, there i s a need f or other methods 
of marketing in addition to cash sales. For example, assume that the 
same Northwest producer planted 100 acres of soybeans in the spring 
of 1979 with an average yield of 33 bushels per acre. I.f the producer 
marketed all of his crop at harvest when the pric e was slightly under 
$6.00 per bushel, his gross receipts would be $19,800. If, however, 
he had forward contracted his crop with a local elevator in early 
June at a price of nearly $7.00 per bushel, his gross receipts would 
be $23,100, an increase of $3,300 . From these examples, the importance 
of the timing of grain sales should be evident. The main purpose of 
this thesis is to develop information that will aid producers in 
timing marketings of corn and soybeans and in selecting profitable 
marketing alternatives. 
Marketing Defined 
Three typical definitions of farm product marketing and marketing 
alternatives are shown below: 
"Marketing and production are interlocked, that they 
depend upon each other, since we can only market products 
which can be produced, and we should only produce those 
that can be marketed. 111 
1
Edward W. Cundiff and Richard R. Still, Basic Marketing, 2nd ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 4. 
3 
" the performance of all business activities involved 
in the flow of goods and services from the point of initial 
agricultural production until they are in the hands of the 
ultimate consumer."l 
"A marketing alternative is defined as a procedure, 
mechanism or system through which producers may sell, or 
influence the terms of sales of his product. 11 2 
Although these definitions reasonably define the terms marketing 
and marketing alternative, they lack important details that are 
necessary for thL study. The first definition emphasizes that 
production and marketing decisions are interrelated; the prices 
available from marketing alternatives may influence the decision of 
which crop is most profitable to produce. However, it does not 
specify the exact activities involved in marketing. The second 
definition describes the traditional concept of marketing as covering 
activities from the point of initial production to the ultimate 
consumer. This definition should be interpreted broadly enough to 
include storage at the point of production and timing of the decision 
to price the crop . In the third definition, the terms of sale would 
logically include price, date of delivery to purchaser, pricing 
procedures, storage expenses involved if any, and other expenses such 
as brokerage fees. 
1Richard L. Kohls and W. David Downey, Marketing of Agricultural 
Products (New York: MacMillan, 1972), quoted in Harold F. Breimyer, 
Economics of the Product Markets af Agriculture (Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1976), pp. 5-6. 
2 
Ronald D. Knutson, Wallace Barr, and William E. Black, "Who 
Will Market Your Products?" Texas Agricultural Extension Service, D-1053 
March 1978, p. 3. 
4 
The marketing alternatives considered here include: (1) cash sale 
at harvest, (2) forward contracting through a local elevator for 
delivery at harvest, (3) use of futures markets to establish prices 
for harvest and post-harvest delivery, and (4) storage of the crop 
beyond harvest without forward pricing. A cash sale is the delivery 
of grain to an elevator or terminal and receipt of the quoted cash 
price for the date of delivery. In forward contracting new crop grain, 
the producer agrees to deliver all or a portion of the crop growing in 
his fields to the elevator at a later date at a specified price. 
Delivery can be at or after harvest, with the exact delivery date 
specified in the contract. In nearly all cases, grain elevator s 
would off set these contracts through forward s~les to merchandisers or 
through use of the futures market to protect against the risk of price 
changes. Techniques for pricing grain in the futures market will be 
described in detail in a later section. 
The main concern of this thesis is with alternatives relating to 
timing and methods of pricing corn and soybeans. Other important 
marketing alternatives not considered in this analysis include those 
dealing with spatial aspects of marketing such as sales at a local 
country elevator versus hauling to a sub-terminal, train-loading 
station, or processor outside the local area. 
A major element in evaluating the four marketing alternatives 
studied here is the basis. Basis can be defined as the difference 
between the price of a particular futures contract and the local cash 
price. The Chicago futures markets generally are recognized as the 
5 
national and world pricing center for corn and soybeans. The basis is 
an indicator of differences in grain values over time and space, and 
is determined by the transfer costs incurred from local points to 
Chicago, local supply and demand conditions, storage capacities both 
at the local level and in Chicago, and existing delivery conditions in 
Chicago and other market centers. It varies seasonally and by 
geographic location. The basis will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 2. 
Objectives1 
To assist Iowa producers in more effectively marketing corn and 
soybeans, this thesis is directed toward an analysis of the four 
marketing alternatives listed in the previous section. The analysis 
reported here focused on two separate price reporting districts within 
Iowa; the Northwest and Southeast districts. These districts were 
chosen to reflect extremes in distance from Iowa to major export 
markets as well as sizeable differences in transportation costs and 
methods of shipping grain to market. Northwest Iowa ships grain 
primarily by rail and has been faced with an uncertain supply of rail 
cars for moving grain in recent years. Southeast Iowa corn and soybeans 
move to export markets primarily by barge shipments on the Mississippi 
River. Another important difference between the two districts is that 
barge rates are unregulated and are priced by supply and demand 
1 
Several terms in this section are commonly used in discussions of 
grain marketing but will be defined specifically in the next chapter. 
6 
conditions, whereas rail rates are regulated by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission of the Federal Government. Additionally, Southeastern Iowa 
river shipments normally are halted during the winter months by ice 
on the Mississippi River. These conditions were expected to cause 
important differences between the cash-futures price relationships of 
the two districts. Differences in local cash-futures price relation-
ships were expected to affect the returns available from various 
marketing alternatives. 
This analysis also includes an examination of basis patterns in 
the Chicago corn and soybean markets. In some cases, conditions in 
these markets may influence local basis patterns and returns to 
producers from various forward pricing alternatives. 
Specific objectives of the project are: 
(1) To determine the costs of delivering corn and soybeans on 
futures contracts from three representative locations within the North-
west and Southeast price reporting districts of Iowa during the 1974 
through 1979 period. These costs will be referred to as the delivery 
cost basis. The corn delivery cost basis will be computed for both 
Chicago and St. Louis to determine which location would be the logical 
futures delivery point from Northwest and Southeast Iowa . Futures 
contract specifications permit delivery at either location in fulfill-
ment of corn futures contracts. 
(2) To compute the weekly basis on cash corn and soybean prices 
f or the Northwest and Southeast Iowa price reporting districts for the 
1974-75 through 1978-79 marketing years which run from October 1 
7 
through September 30. 
(3) To compare the weekly corn and soybean basis for these 
marketing years with the corresponding delivery cost basis. This 
comparison will indicate whether delivery costs set a maximum limit 
on the local basis, and will determine whether incentives for delivery 
of Iowa corn and soybeans on futures markets have occurred in recent 
years. 
(4) To analyze corn and soybean basis changes and potential 
gross returns from storage hedges placed at harvest and lifted after 
three, six, and eight months' storage. 
(5) To compute the weekly basis reflected in new-crop corn and 
soybean contracting prices at local elevators for harvest delivery 
during the summers of 1976 through 1979 and to compare these basis 
patterns with the actual basis that resulted during the corresponding 
harvest seasons. Since new-crop contracting prices for harvest 
delivery were first reported in 1976 in official price reports from 
the Iowa Department of Agriculture, comparisons for earlier years are 
not possible. Comparisons from 1976 through 1979, however, should 
indicate to what extent basis uncertainty has affected new crop 
contracting prices i n recent years. 
(6) To compute the daily Chicago corn and soybean basis for 
expiring futures contracts during the last twenty-five trading days 
for the years 1974 through 1979. Failure of cash and futures prices 
to converge or a widely fluctuating basis during the contract 
expiration month would be evidence of possible impediments to delivery 
8 
in Chicago and could adversely affect basis patterns in other areas. 
(7) To compare the daily Chicago corn and soybean basis for the 
marketing years 1974 through 1979 with the Chicago delivery cost basis 
during the same period. 
(8) To compute corn and soybean prices offered by preharvest 
hedging alternatives and new-crop contracting for harvest delivery 
during the early June, mid-July, mid-August, mid-September periods 
for the years 1976 through 1979 for the two Iowa price reporting 
districts. 
(9) To compare the prices received from pre-harvest hedging and 
new-crop contracting for the years 1976 through 1979 with the prices 
received at harvest during the same years. 
Sources of Price Data 
The Marketing Division of the Iowa Department of Agriculture 
began compiling daily cash grain prices for six Iowa price reporting 
districts in 1974. Boundaries for districts used in the price 
reporting program are shown in Figure 1-1. In this analysis, the mid-
point of reported Thursday cash prices for the Northwest and Southeast 
districts were used in evaluating producer marketing alternatives. L£ 
a holiday occurred on a Thursday, prices for the previous trading 
day were used. Iowa cash prices are compiled after the daily close 
of futures markets. 
Futures prices were compiled from the Wall Street Journal for the 
years 1974 and 1975, and from files of the Iowa State University Market 
News Office for the years 1976 through 1979. Futures prices used here 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
--.. ·
-~\
 -
:-
:-
i 
l.
•
O
 .
. 
O
K
(
O
t.
4
 
Ot
Cl
ll
'
•f
rl
ll
~ 
(
.M
M
C
T
 
-
~
,
 .. 
.
,
 • .
.
,
.
 L
a
.A
 &
.O
 
W
O
l
t
T
"
 
,.
..
.
,
,
 ...
. C
:l
.\
. 
.
.
t.>
..
,A
•
O
 
--
-
-
.S
I
O
V
 )
t 
o
·a
.
,~
,.
..
 
, ..
.....
... 
~A
'-
0 
A
\.
t'
O
 
·
·
-
..
 ;
>
<
:•
 
a
.A
A
O
..
..
..
, 
,
~
o
v
o
 
....
....
-..
--
(J
i>
.,
 t
, 
'c.
 
C
L
A
Y
 T
O
"
' 
,.
 ...
 V
M
O
U
T
"
 
C
"
lP
O
•t
.L
 
...
.._
 ..
 4 
"'
~"
' 
,.
.,
._
o
 ..
 r
~
 
-
~
,.
,
.
.
T
 
..
..
..
..
. U
H
 
a
.u
t'
\.
.C
.•
 
.. , ..
. (
.
 
\_
 
~
r
C
A
 
"""
""'
..,.
.,..
. 
~"
"'
" 
C
)(
.1
.,
>
W
A
J
I(
 
1 
Ou
~o
1Q
'\
,I
C. 
~--
°""
"' 
L 
....
 
3
A
C
 
;..
...
.,.
.o
v,
. 
~
T
o
.
r
.
 
H
.A
ll
O
I,
. 
C
•W
 ..
 O
'Y
 
I 
I 
I 
T.a
'"'""
"" 
O
L
""
T
C
>
f"
 
..,
,. 
.. 
~
O
t"
\I
C.
b 
.
J
•
~
O
""
 
\'"•
• 
C
A
A
\J
f"
O
 ..
 D
 
c.
. .
..
 °"
-
~«
.e
,,
.c
. 
..
O
O
•
t 
O
T
O
A
V
 
.....
.....
 ,"
".u
.. 
C
.1
..
1
,.
.T
O
"'
 
l 
,,:,
...J
.t 
t--·
 .,,.,.., .. o
v
 
.W
O
..
 
•
u
1
 "
'°
t. 
~
·
 
..
..
.,
G
P
L
A
 
~
-
.... 
1
0
 ..
. A
o.
 
.-
.. 
.....
... 
"
'°
'-
"
 
~C
:O
T
T 
1 
l 
,.
.,
~n
""
 
I 
l-··
r··
 .. ~
 
~
a
 
~
 
W
A
.R
A
C
" 
....
....
,°"
 
M
A
l"
I •
>
 11
(,A
 
•l
.0
•"
" 
----
-.._ ...
....
... 
\ 
"'
-"
U
• 
~
c
o
.
r
 ..
. 
.
.
.
.
,
~
o 
~
•
>
0
"
 
. ..,. ..
... 
( 
~
 
u
"'
-
C
\.
A
&
A
L
 
.....
 ~
 
"
°
1
'-
•
X
 
C
lt
.J
..
O
-
t.
>
 
I z~-
· 
~
 
T
'A
Y
\.
O
• 
-
-
..
. 
~
 .....
. 
"""
'"~
 
A
n'
,,.
,,.
00
"'-
0 
..
 ..
.,
, 
.,U
JI>
 f
M
,1
:1
' .
.. 
.... 
F
ig
u
re
 1
-1
. 
Io
w
a 
g
ra
in
 p
ri
c
e
 r
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
 
10 
were the midpoint of the Thursday daily closing price ranges. Again, 
if Thursday was a holiday, the previous trading day was used. 
Chicago cash prices were obtained from daily closing prices 
reported in the Chicago Board of Trade Annual Summaries for the years 
1974 and 1975 and from the files of the Iowa State University Market 
News Office for the years 1976 through 1979. 
Previous Research 
Previous research in Iowa relating to this subject includes a 
thesis entitled, "Analysis of Corn and Soybean Cash-Futures Price 
1 Relationships in North Central Iowa," written by H. Alan Carver. This 
work emphasizes the importance of basis information in evaluating 
potential hedging opportunities in futures markets and in choosing 
among marketing alternatives. Another Iowa study by Dr. Robert N. 
Wisner contains a fourteen-year corn and soybean basis history for 
Central Iowa. This report entitled, "Basis Patterns for Corn and Soy-
beans in Central Iowa," stresses the importance of basis knowledge and 
its use in evaluating hedging opportunities. 
Other related work includes a University of Minnesota study of 
the corn and soybean basis for Southern Minnesota for the period 1972 
through 1975. 2 Additional analyses of grain hedging opportunities also 
~. Alan Carver, "Analysis of Corn and Soybean Cash-Futures Price 
Relationships in North Central Iowa" (Master of Science thesis, Iowa 
State University, 1978.) 
2 
Raymond Dahl and Patrick Henneberry, "Cash-Futures Price Relation-
ships - Guides to Grain Marketing, 11 .University of Minnesota Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin 517-1977, 1977. 
11 
have been conducted a t South Dakota State University, the University 
1 
of Kentucky, and the University of Illinois. 
Although the out-of-state studies stress the importance of basis 
and the use of basis patterns for hedging decisions, they are not 
direct indicators of hedging returns in Iowa since returns for various 
marketing alternatives depend on local conditions. 
The Central and North Central Iowa studies provide basis patterns 
and an analysis of hedging opportunities that are relevant in their 
respective districts. However, they do not include analyses of new-
crop pricing alternatives during the summer or discussions of potential 
impacts of the Chicago basis on local market conditions. 
Method of Presentation 
The thesis will include in order: Q) definitions and explanations 
of terms relevant to this analysis; (2) an outline of theoretical cash-
futures price relationships over space; (3) an in-depth analysis of 
Chicago basis patterns and their possible effects on local basis figures; 
(4) an outline of theoretical cash-futures price relationships over time 
and a comparison of returns from storage hedges and unhedged storage; 
(2_) new-crop pricing results including pre-harvest hedging and forward 
contracting; and (6) concluding remarks summarizing available marketing 
alternatives and the potential returns from each during the 1974 through 
1979 period. 
1 
See Arthur B. Sogn, "Farmers Use of Grain Futures," South Dakota 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 590, November 1971; Steve A. 
Callahan, "Grain Merchandising and Futures Markets in Kentucky," 
Kentucky Cooperative Extension Service Series No. 7, March 1972; and 
T. A. Hieronymus, "When to Sell Corn, Soybeans, Oats, and Wheat," 
Illinois Cooperative Extension Service, Circular 833, October 1966. 
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CHAPTER II. EXPLANATION OF HEDGING, CONTRACTING, 
AND OTHER MARKETING PROCEDURES 
Before analyzing corn and soybean marketing alternatives, an 
understanding of the terms and methods relevant to the decision process 
is necessary. Important terms and marketing procedures used in this 
report are explained and defined in the sections that follow. 
Futures Trading 
Futures trading involves the buying and selling of standardized 
1 contracts for future delivery of a specified commodity. These 
instruments are legal contracts, enforceable by the rules of the 
exchanges on which they are traded, to deliver or accept delivery of 
a definite amount of a commodity during a specified month at a specified 
2 price. Locations at which delivery may be made also are specified by 
the futures contracts. 
The two major exchanges which provide futures contracts for corn 
and soybeans are the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Mid-America 
Exchange (MAE), both located in Chicago. A comparison of futures 
contracts for these commodities on the two exchanges reveals only two 
main differences. First, the CBOT contracts are traded in 5,000 
bushel increments while the MAE trades in 1,000 bushel increments. 
Secondly, CBOT high and low prices are published for each day's trading, 
1william G. Tomek and Kenneth L. Robinson, Agricultural Product 
Prices (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 234. 
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while only closing prices on MAE are published. 
A futures contract as defined here calls for the delivery or 
acceptance of a specific grade of a commodity at a specified future 
time and at a specific location or locations. For example, it is 
possible to deliver No. 2 yellow corn at approved warehouses in Chicago, 
St. Louis, or Toledo, Ohio, or No. 2 yellow soybeans at Chicago and 
Toledo to fulfill a Chicago Board of Trade contract. If the grain 
being delivered is not of the same grade as specified in the contract, 
substitute grades may be delivered at fixed discounts or premiums. 
For example, No. 1 yellow corn can be delivered on futures contracts 
at a 1/2 cent per bushel premium while No. 3 yellow with a 15.5 percent 
moisture maximum is acceptable at a 2 1/2 cent discount. In soybean 
futures, premiums and discounts of three cents and two cents per 
bushel respectively have been applied in recent years for delivery of 
No. 1 yellow and No. 3 yellow grades, provided the latter grade 
contains 14 percent moisture or less. 
The futures trader is responsible to a futures clearing house for 
any decline in the value of his futures contract. His net position is 
cancelled when the trader offsets his original position through another 
futures trade in the same contract delivery month. For example, a 
purchase would offset a previous futures contract sale. 
It should also be noted that delivery on futures contracts is at 
the seller's option. This means the seller is the one who decides 
whether to make delivery on his contract. Delivery can be made at 
anytime dur~ng the delivery month, and the seller also must make the 
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decision of where delivery will be made. If a notice to deliver is 
given, the clearing house then notifies a trader with a net long (or 
purchased) position that he is scheduled to receive delivery . The 
trader receiving such a notice has two alternatives; he may sell his 
contract and pass the notice to another trader or accept delivery 
of the grain. Alternatively, he may decide to take delivery, then sell 
the commodity in the cash market. Delivery notices are allocated to 
long traders by age of outstanding positions, with the oldest longs 
receiving the first delivery notices. 
Futures traders can be categorized as hedgers and speculators. 
Hedgers are traders who use futures contracts as a temporary substitute 
for a later transaction in the cash market. 1 Their main motive for 
trading in futures contracts is to protect profit margins from the 
risk of price changes. A selling hedge by cash grain producers would 
begin with the sale of a futures contract. A grain buying hedge, 
useful to livestock feeders and grain exporters, is initiated with a 
purchase of a contract. 
Speculators trade in the futures market with the expectation of 
2 making a profit from price changes. They typically do not use their 
positions as substitutes for cash transactions. Speculators can be 
subdivided into three general categories. Scalpers are speculators 
1iiolbrook Working, "Hedging Reconsidered," Journal of Farm 
Economics 35, No . 4 (November 1953): p. 553. 
2
Tomek and Robinson, Agricultural Product Prices, p. 236. 
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1 who trade frequently on small price changes. Their profits and losses 
result from minute-to-minute or day-to-day trends. Scalpers are not 
long-term position holders. A second type of speculator, the position 
trader tends to take a position in the market with expectations of 
profiting from longer term price movements. 2 For example, if this 
type of trader expects the price of a specific contract to rise, he 
will buy the contract hoping to sell it at a higher price at a later 
time. A third type of speculator is the spreader. Spreaders 
simultaneously purchase one futures contract month and sell contracts 
calling for delivery at a different time, often with the same 
commodity. 3 They do this because they believe that the difference or 
spread between the two futures contract prices is unusually large or 
small and represents an opportunity to profit from changing price 
relationships. If the expected change actually occurs, the spreader 
will make a profit when his initial transactions are offset. 
Basis 
In analyzing and choosing among marketing alternatives, an 
important concept is the local grain basis. Basis can be defined as 
the difference between the local cash price and the price -0f a 
4 specific futures contract. The basis can vary substantially from 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 240. 
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area to area. 
For example, if May soybean futures contracts at the Chicago 
Board of Trade are trading at $6.75 per bushel and the cash price at 
a Southeast Iowa elevator is $6.20, the local basis is $.55 under May . 
Note that basis can be either positive or negative. If the basis 
is negative as in the preceding example, the local cash price is 
below the futures market price and the basis is stated in cents under 
futures. In the case of a positive basis, the opposite occurs. For 
example, if the basis is +$.40, this denotes the local cash price is 
$.40 above the futures contract price. Basis behavior will be used 
here to analyze and evaluate the various marketing alternatives 
available to cash grain producers. 
Hedging 
Hedging can be defined as the practice of buying or selling 
1 futures contracts to offset an existing position in the cash market. 
This procedure is designed to protect the producer against any unfore-
seen major movement in price. For example, if a producer owns 
inventory of a commodity and is faced with a possible decline in 
market price, he may hedge to reduce price risk. This would be 
accomplished by selling contracts in the futures market in a volume 
equal to the physical commodity inventory. 
Hedging is based on the assumption that cash and futures prices 
rise and decline together. This leaves the hedger in a position where 
1 Ibid., p. 236. 
) 
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losses or ga ins resulting from unforeseen cash market changes will be 
offset by approximately equal and offsetting gains or losses from his 
1 futures position. In the example above, if prices decline, losses 
that occur from the cash holdings will be about offset by gains 
resulting from the futures sale. 
This example assumes gains and losses from cash and futures trans-
actions will about offset each other. While this is theoretically 
correct, the following conditions usually prevent actual equality of 
2 gains and losses from occurring: 
(1) Because of basis changes, exact parallel price rises and 
declines in the two markets seldom occur. 
(2) Brokerage charges and margin costs have to be paid 
on hedging transactions in commodity futures. 
(3) Quality, delivery conditions, and payment terms of commodity 
futures contracts can be appreciably different from those 
applicable to the cash commodity being hedged. 
It is important to note that hedging does not guarantee a profit 
will occur or that a loss will be avoided. Other influences on net 
returns include possible spoilage or shrinkage of the commodity, 
changes in transportation costs, and handling and storage costs. 
1 
G. Wright Hoffman, Future Trading Upon 
Markets in the United States (Philadelphia: 
Press, 1932), pp. 381-82. 
Organized Commodity 
University of Pennsylvania 
2 
Henry B. Arthur, Commodity Futures as a Business Management Tool 
(Boston: Harvard University, 1971), p. 52. 
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However, hedging can protect the producer or other businesses against 
major unforeseen movements in price. 
Preharvest hedge 
A preharvest hedge can be accomplished by selling futures 
1 contracts during the growing season. As the producer harvests his 
crops he then simultaneously sells his eash crop and buys back his 
futures commitment. Through a preharvest hedge, the producer 
establishes a price that will be received at harvest and protects 
himself against unforeseen major price movements that may occur during 
or before harvest. 
In deciding whether to use a preharvest hedge, the producer should 
first estimate the local price to be received from the hedging trans-
action. As an example of how this would be done, suppose that in 
early June of the growing season the December corn futures contract is 
selling for $2.80 per bushel. To localize the futures price, two 
items would be deducted as shown below: 
December futures price in early June 
Minus: Normal basis at harvest 
Brokerage and interest on 
margin deposit 
Total 
Target price at the local level 
.50 
.02 
$2.80/bushel 
-.52 
$2.28 
Note that the basis is the largest deduction in the above example. 
Information on probable harvest basis figures can be calculated from 
local price records for the past few years. The cost of future 
~obert N. Wisner, "Using Grain Futures in the Farm Businese," 
Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service, Pm-687, March 1976, pp. 5-6 . 
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trading listed in the previous example includes conunission charges to 
a broker, and interest income foregone by depositing money in a margin 
account with the broker. Margin deposits typically range from 5 to 
15 percent of the total value of the contracts. The purpose of the 
margin deposit is to provide protection against default by the trader. 
Additional margin deposits may be required with adverse pri~e movements 
(e.g., a price rise for the seller). Such deposits are known as 
margin calls. However, if the price declines for the seller he may 
at his option withdraw the profits from futures trading which have 
accumulated in his margin account. 
In the example above with a perfect hedge, assuming the $.SO basis 
actually occurs at harvest, a producer would receive $2.28 per bushel 
for his hedged crop. The December futures contract that was sold for 
$2.80 in June would be cancelled by buying back the futures conunitment 
at a price $.50 above the cash price. For this reason, the $.50 and 
the $.02 brokerage and margin costs are deducted from the original 
futures contract sale and a projected price of $2.28 results. 
In deciding whether to hedge, the producer should consider his 
expectations of the cash prices that will be received at harvest. If 
he believes the harvest price will be below $2.28 he should consider 
hedging a portion of the crop. It is important that the producer not 
hedge all of his expected production early in the growing season, 
since his actual production may be less than expected. In addition, 
it should be noted that he can only sell futures in 1,000 or 5,000 
bushel increments. As the grow1:ng season ensues, he can better estimate 
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the yield to be expected and may wish to increase the size of his 
hedge by selling additional contracts. 
Storage hedge 
A storage hedge is accomplished by selling futures contracts at 
harvest and storing the cash crop until some later date, usually late 
spring of the following year when the basis historically narrows. At 
that time the hedger would simultaneously sell his cash crop and buy 
1 back futures contracts. A storage hedge in the July futures contract 
would allow the producer to earn storage income while providing price 
protection. 
In deciding whether to establish a storage hedge, the producer 
should first estimate the expected storage returns from the hedging 
transaction. 2 The return for storage can be calculated as follows: 
where 
R = return to storage 
BB = beginning basis 
BE = expected ending basis 
RC = expected hedging costs 
Assuming that the July futures basis in November is $.90 under, 
that the ending basis is expected to be $.50 under in early June and 
1 Ibid. , pp. 6-8. 
2 
Formula received from Dr. Ronald Raikes, Professor of Economics, 
Iowa State University, Winter quarter classnotes, 1979. 
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expected hedging costs are $.02, the gross return for storage would 
be $.38. To determine if hedging is profitable, a comparison between 
this return and the actual costs of storage should be made. If the 
actual costs are less than $.38, the storage hedge offers a potential 
profit. If storage costs exceed $.38, expected net returns from a 
\ 
storage hedge would be negative. 
Note that the return for storage is the change in basis from the 
time the storage hedge is placed until the time it is lifted minus 
hedging costs. The following example illustrates how the change in 
basis equals the return for storage. In this example, futures prices 
decreased by $.35 per bushel, giving a 35 cent return on futures 
transactions, whereas cash prices rose by $.10 per bushel giving a 
10 cent return on the cash transactions. The combined return (i.e., 
$.45 per bushel) from the futures and cash transactions equals the 
basis at the time the storage hedge was placed minus the basis when 
the hedge was lifted (i . e., $.85 - .40 = $ . 45). 
Futures market Cash market Basis 
Placement of storage hedge: 
Oct. 1 - Sell July futures @ $2.95 Buy cash @ $2.10 $.85 
Lifting the hedge: 
June 15 - Buy July futures @ $2.60 Sell cash @ $2.20 $.40 
Return from futures $.35 from cash $.10 Total $.45 
22 
The producer should next consider which direction prices are 
likely to move from the time the hedge is placed until the time the 
hedge is lifted. If the expected return to the producer from not 
hedging is greater than from hedging, he should consider storing his 
grain and selling it at a later date without using the futures market. 
The producer's ability to absorb financial risks from a decline in 
cash prices should also be considered in the hedging decision. 
Cash Sale 
A cash sale is the act of delivering grain to the local elevator 
and receiving the cash price quoted for immediate delivery. Tradition-
ally, this has been the typical method used by Iowa corn and soybean 
producers to market their crops. Cash sales have the advantage that 
little or no technical knowledge is required for their use. 
Forward Contracting 
Forward contracting occurs when a producer enters into a written 
agreement locking in a specific price for delivery of a specified 
quantity of product to a local elevator or processor at a specified 
1 time such as during the harvest season. For example, let's suppose 
that in April a producer received a bid from an elevator of $6.95 per 
bushel for soybeans to be delivered in November. If the producer 
expects prices to decline between April and November, he may wish to 
1 
Arthur B. Sogn and Richard K. Rudel, eds., "Marketing Alternatives 
for Producers of Wheat," Agricultural Information Office,· South Dakota 
State University, Brookings, South Dakota, 1973, p. 13. 
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enter into this type of contract. If on the other hand, he expects 
prices to rise, the producer may decide not to forward contract. 
Assume the producer enters into a forward contract with a local 
elevator at this price. He now is obligated to deliver a designated 
quantity of soybeans in November. As with preharvest hedging, it is 
generally advisable that the producer not forward contract all of his 
expected production because of uncertain yield prospects. 
Forward contracting at times may have price advantages over cash 
sales, along with the primary disadvantage that it does not protect 
against uncertain yields. When the producer enters into a forward 
contract he knows the price he will receive. If the contracted price 
allows a profit and the producer is not able or willing to risk lower 
prices, such a contract can be a useful marketing alternative . Forward 
contracts allow a smaller producer to sell in quantities more closely 
matching his production than might be available through hedging in the 
futures market. If a preharvest hedge were used, the futures contracts 
can be traded only in 1,000 or 5,000 bushel increments. A forward 
contract also may help to guarantee the producer an outlet for his 
grain if storage space is lacking. Io years with serious transportation 
problems, some elevators have been reluctant to purchase grain at 
harvest until they are assured of transporta tion services. However, if 
the grain was purchased earlier on contracts, such grain is likely to 
be accepted for delivery at harvest. 
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Deferred Pricing Contracts 
Deferred pricing or price later contracts and basis contracts are 
marketing alternatives initiated for the purpose of dealing with 
1 possible grain handling and transportation problems. Price later 
contracts allow a producer to deliver grain to the elevator at harvest, 
but delay pricing until later in the season. Once the contract is 
negotiated, title to the grain is transferred from the producer to the 
elevator, thus permitting the elevator to use its facilities more 
efficiently by shipping the grain when transportation equipment is 
available. 
Basis contracts are written agreements specifying that the grain 
is to be priced at a predetermined discount from the price for a given 
futures contract delivery month. The two parties to the contract agree 
on the futures contract month to be used, and the seller is allowed to 
choose any trading day to price the grain up to the deadline specified 
within the contract. 
For example, if a $.60 basis under the May futures was used, the 
producer would be able to select his price simply by subtracting $.60 
from the quoted May futures price on the day of his choice. The $.60 
basis would be deducted to cover all storage, shrinkage, and 
transportation costs incurred by the elevator. As with price later 
contracts, title to the grain is transferred to the elevator at the 
~obert N. Wisner, C. Phillip Baumel, and John A. Wallize, "New 
Way to Sell Corn: How It Worked," Wallaces Farmer 100, No. 7 (April 
12, 1975):76-77. 
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time i t i s delivered. Thus , the grain can be shipped out when avail-
ability of transportation equipment permits. 
With price later contracts, the producer is permitted to price 
his grain using the regular posted bid at the elevator instead of 
the futures price minus a basis deduction. If the producer uses this 
alternative, he typically agrees to pay a daily or monthly service 
charge which would be approximately comparabl e to elevator storage 
charges . The producer usually has no other costs in these alternatives 
except interest income foregone until the grain is priced and full pay-
ment is received. However, in some basis contracts the seller's 
price is reduced by the amount of any increase in freight rates that 
occurs between the date the contract is initiated and the date the 
grain is priced . Also, a cash advance is sometimes made on basis and 
price later contracts . This would result in a savings on interest 
costs on the seller's grain marketing. 
When deciding whether to use delayed pricing or store grain at 
t he elevator, the producer should consider the contract basis or 
service charge, likely future basis charges, storage costs, and 
expected future price trends. 
The next chapter deals with the various factors effecting basis 
(price relationships between the cash and futures markets). An under-
standing of these relationships is important in evaluating contracting 
and hedging alternatives available to cash grain producers. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN CASH AND FUTURES PRICES 
The relationship between cash and futures prices determines the 
price that will be obtained through hedging. Hedging returns also 
can be used as a benchmark in evaluating forward contracting alterna-
tives as well as cash prices and storage returns. 
Two basic price relationships exist between the cash and futures 
markets; the relationship over time (intertemporal) and over space 
(spatial). 
Spatial Price Relationships 
Many agricultural commodities reflect areas of surplus and 
deficit supplies. Processors, exporters, and other users seek to 
purchase in areas of surplus supplies where costs are lowest, for 
resale in locations where the crop is more valuable. Incentive for 
movement from one area to another is accomplished through a pricing 
mechanism taking into account transfer costs. These costs include 
l loading, handling and transportation costs. 
In the case of corn and soybeans, Chicago is the par delivery 
point for corn and soybean futures contracts, and prices in the six 
reporting districts of Iowa are influenced by the transfer costs 
between Chicago and each reporting district. Because of this, grain 
prices may differ substantially from one district to another, 
1 
Thomas A. Hieronymus, Economics of Futures Trading (New York : 
Commodity Research Bureau, Inc . 1971), pp. 167-68. 
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depending on relative distances from Chicago . 
Price differences among areas should not be expected to exceed 
transfer cost differences to major markets for any length of time if 
transportation services are readily available. The reasoning for 
this is that price differences exceeding these costs would provide 
incentives to transfer the commodity from the outlying districts to 
major markets. This movement would continue until transferring of 
the commodity is no longer profitable, that i s , until the price 
difference between the markets no longer exceeds transfer costs. 
Futures delivery costs and spatial price relationships 
For similar reasons, differences between local cash prices and 
expiring grain futures prices should not be expected to exceed costs 
of delivering on futures contracts if transportation services are 
readily available. For example, if the price for the expiring corn 
futures contract is $2.65 per bushel and transfer costs are $.70 per 
bushel from Northwest Iowa to Chicago, then the cash price within 
this district at futures contract maturity should not be expected to 
drop below $1.95. Otherwise, an incentive would exist to purchase 
corn locally, sell futures contracts and deliver on the futures 
market. The commodity would be transferred from Northwest Iowa to 
Chicago until the incentive for delivery disappears. However, it 
should also be noted that Northwest Iowa relies heavily on rail 
transportation for movement of its crops. If rail transportation 
problems or inadequate supplies of transportation equipment occur in 
this region, price differences could exceed delivery costs. The same 
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potential would exist if impediments to delivery were to occur at 
futures delivery points. 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to compare the actual 
corn and soybean basis in the expiring contract month with the 
corresponding delivery cost basis . This comparison will indicate 
whether delivery costs set a maximum limit on the local basis and 
will determine whether incentives for delivery of Iowa corn and 
soybeans on futures markets have occurred in recent years. These 
results will be discussed in detail later in this chapter . 
If a producer or grain elevator manager decides to deliver on a 
futures contract, he is responsible for all costs of delivery. The 
delivery process involves placing grain under warehouse receipt at 
approved delivery elevators and paying for costs of obtaining a ware-
house receipt. Inspection and grading as required by CBOT and MAE, 
storage until title is transferred to the contract buyer, insurance, 
and interest on inventory until payment is received are a part of 
the delivery cost. Thus, costs of delivering on futures contracts 
include transportation costs, weighing, inspection, and grading at the 
destination, storage, insurance, and interest on the commodity as well 
as a merchandising margin received by the country elevator to cover 
its costs. 
Transportation costs make up a large portion of the total delivery 
costs and will vary depending upon the type of transportation used. 
For example, rail transportation rates are available for single car or 
multicar shipments, with the rates decreasing as more cars are used 
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per shipment. Rail rates also are classified as domestic or export. 
To deliver on Chicago grain futures contracts, a domestic rate that 
1 provides transit billing is needed. Transit billing provides for 
shipments to Chicago with an option of moving the grain from Chicago 
to other locations for processing, grading, or other activities. The 
export rate is used for shipments to Chicago for export only. Export 
rates are lower than those for domestic shipments. 
Two types of domestic rail rates are available from Chicago to 
other destinations. These types are classified as flat and propor-
tional rates. The flat rate is used when the crop is shipped from 
Chicago directly to a specified location whereas the proportional rate 
permits grain to be shipped to processing plants or to have grading or 
other activities performed along the way, with the end products shipped 
on to other locations. If futures contract obligations are filled by 
truck delivery, the difference between the flat and proportional rail 
rates from Chicago to New York is used to determine the value of 
transit billing. This is added as an extra cost of delivery to be paid 
by the seller. It permits the buyer who takes delivery to move the 
grain out of Chicago to a location of his choice at the same cost as if 
2 it had moved into Chicago under a transit rail rate. 
1 Remember that the domestic rate allows the trader who is accepting 
the delivery of grain to move it from Chicago to other locations, where-
as the export rate does not allow this movement. For the rules asso-
ciated with delivery, see Rules and Regulations, Board of Trade of the 
City of Chicago (Chicago: Chicago Board of Trade, September 1, 1977), 
pp. 111-17; and MidAmerica Commodity Exchange Rules (Chicago: Mid-
American ColIBD.odity Exchange, May 1976), Chapter 5, pp. 1-6. 
2 Conversation with Frank Polem, Chicago Board of Trade Transporta-
tion Specialist, Chicago, 21 August 1979. 
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As previously mentioned, three representative locations were 
chosen within the Northwest and Southeast Iowa price reporting 
districts for use in determining the delivery cost basis. These 
locations were selected to provide potential shipping services from 
a major portion of each district. Adequate elevator capacities and 
transportation services by at least two railroad lines also were used 
as general criteria. For the purpose of this analysis, the delivery 
costs from the three locations were averaged to obtain a single 
delivery cost basis for each district. 
Rail transportation rates, as with most other costs, have 
increased throughout the 1974-79 period as a result of rising fuel, 
labor, and equipment costs. For example, average Northwest Iowa 
domestic corn rail rates to Chicago during the 1974 through 1979 period 
increased from 24.5 to 47.7 cents per bushel. Soybean rates during 
this same period increased from 28.5 to 59.7 cents per bushel. The 
same analysis for Southeast Iowa shows an increase of 16.9 to 33.5 
and 21.2 to 42.5 cents per bushel for corn and soybean delivery, 
respectively. Note that Southeast Iowa rail rates were eight to 
seventeen cents less than the corresponding rates from Northwest Iowa. 
This difference can be attributed to the difference in distances from 
the locations within each district to Chicago. 
Trucks may also be used to deliver grain on a f utures contract; 
as with rail freight, these rates have increased substantially during 
the 1974-79 period because of inflation in major cost components. 
Truck rates were obtained from personal communications with truck1:ng 
31 
firms and were designated as mid-year rates. Industry sources noted 
that truck rates vary considerably with market conditions and back haul 
availability since rates for agricultural products are unregulated. 
However, they indicated these rates are believed to be typical for the 
time periods considered here. Truck rates from Northwest and Southeast 
Iowa to Chicago were the same for the first five years of the study, 
27 to 30 cents per bushel, and during the last year Southeast Iowa 
held a 7.5 to 10 cents per bushel advantage over Northwest Iowa rates. 
This advantage is probably explained in part by demand conditions and 
back haul situations. 
Which futures delivery points are appropriate for Iowa grain? 
If a producer or grain elevator operator should decide to deliver 
on a CBOT or MAE corn futures contract, he has the option of delivering 
to one of three different delivery areas: Chicago, St. Louis, or 
Toledo, Ohio. On soybean contracts, he could only deliver to Chicago 
until September 1979, when Toledo, Ohio was added as a soybean delivery 
point. Because of the greater distance from Iowa, Toledo does not 
appear feasible as a point for delivery of Iowa grain under normal 
conditions and thus will not be included in this analysis. 
If a hedger delivers to St. Louis, there is a four cents per 
bushel discount from the corn futures contract price. For example, if 
the CBOT futures quote on the day of delivery is $2.70, the deliverer of 
grain will receive $2.66 at St. Louis. 
Another point which may have a bearing on the ability to deliver is 
the amount of approved storage available at delivery points. There are 
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47,285,000 bushels of capacity available in Chicago and 17,005,000 
bushels at St. Louis in grain warehouses which are authorized to 
accept delivery to fulfill futures contracts. The authorized ware-
houses in Chicago are: Cargill, Incorporated; Continental Grain 
Company; Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, Incorporated; 
and General Mills, Incorporated. In St. Louis, delivery may be made 
to: St. Louis Grain Corporation; Peavey Company; or Continental Grain 
Company. 1 However, it should be noted that these warehouses are 
privately owned and are not obligated to receive grain on a futures 
contract. Thus, it is essential that a hedger confirm space in one 
of the warehouses before attempting to make delivery. In most cases, 
these uncertainties and potential transportation problems make it 
desirable to close out hedges by off setting the original futures 
position rather than through delivery. However, an effective delivery 
mechanism is important to the operation of grain futures markets. Only 
if delivery is possible or the threat of delivery is effective, would 
one expect the delivery costs to set the maximum differential between 
local cash prices and expiring futures contract prices. 
In comparing transportation costs to Chicago and St. Louis from 
Southeast Iowa, it was found that both truck and rail rates to Chicago 
for 1979 were less than to St. Louis. Truck rates to Chicago are less 
because transportation firms are relatively sure that they can haul 
1 
Exact warehouse capacities of individual companies may be obtained 
from the Chicago office of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
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back a full load from Chicago, whereas this is not the case with 
St. Louis. 1 The rail rates from Southeast Iowa to Chicago for the 
last quarter of 1979 ranged from 30.5 to 36.4 cents per bushel, where-
2 
as rail rates to St. Louis ranged from 49.3 to 56.0 cents per bushel. 
Thus, rail shipments to St. Louis also would be more expensive than 
for Chicago delivery . 
Trade sources indicate truck rates for the last quarter of 1979 
from Southeast Iowa to Chicago and St. Louis were approximately the 
same at 32.5 cents per bushel. However, when the four cent per bushel 
discount for a nonpar delivery point is taken into account it made 
delivery to St. Louis a higher cost alternative than Chicago delivery. 
Truck rates from Northwest Iowa to Chicago and St. Louis in late 
1979 were not identical. Northwest Iowa rates were about ten cents 
per bushel higher for delivery to St. Louis than to Chicago. These 
higher transportation costs in addition to the four cent per bushel 
discount on delivery tends to eliminate St. Louis delivery from the 
two Iowa districts as a viable alternative. Thus, the attention here 
was focused on the delivery costs to Chicago. 
To determine whether delivery costs actually set a lower limit on 
basis, total delivery costs were compiled for both the Northwest and 
Southeast price reporting districts. These costs are shown in 
1
conversation with James Zigring, Umthun Trucking Company Billing 
Officer, Eagle Grove, Iowa, 6 March 1980. 
2 
Conversation with Al Birkibine, Iowa Department of Transportation 
Rail Transportation Specialist, Des Moines, 11 March 1980. 
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Tables 3-1 through 3-4 and Appendix Tables A-1 through A-4. Total 
rail delivery costs are comprised of five components: single-car 
freight rates. elevator charges at the delivery point, storage and 
insurance, interest costs, and the country elevater's merchandising 
margin. The largest single item is the rail transportation cost, 
discussed previously. The elevator charges consist of weighing, 
grading, elevation, and inspec tion at the delivery point. The~e costs 
are incurred in obtaining a warehouse receipt for the grain, as 
1 required by CBOT or MAE regulations. Storage, insurance, and 
interest costs are incurred until title to the grain is passed to the 
person or firm who bought the futures contract. The last component is 
the country elevator's merchandising margin. This is an assumed margin 
incurred by the person or firm making delivery to cover the operating 
costs at the country elevator. The actual margins will vary from time 
to time and from one area to another, depending on market conditions. 
Three conclusions are immediately noticeable from Tables 3-1 
through 3-4: (1) delivery costs have increased substantially in the 
three year period from 1977 through 1979; (2) delivery costs are lower 
in Southeast Iowa than in Northwest Iowa; and (3) the cost differential 
between the two districts has widened significantly during the past 
three years . The rail delivery cost basis has increased from 29 to 
44 percent during the three years ending 1979, with the exact increase 
varying between districts and crops, depending on the initial freight 
1
Rules and Regulations Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 
pp. 111-17; and Mid.America Connnodity Exchange Rules, Chapter 5, pp. 1-6. 
Table 3-1. Estimated costs for delivery of corn and soybeans by rail 
from Northwest Iowa to approved futures delivery elevators 
in Chicago, 1977-79 in cents per bushel 
Corn 
Storage Merchan-
Time Single Elevator and Interest dising Total 
Origin interval cara chargesb insur.b on croE marginc costs 
Denison 1- 07-77 32.20 5 . 0 0.4 0.8 6.0 44.40 
Sioux City to 40 . 88 5.0 0.4 0.8 6.0 53.08 
Spencer 2-21-78 31.64 5.0 0. 4 0.8 6.0 43.64 
Denison 2-22-78 33.88 5.0 0.4 0.7 7.0 46.98 
Sioux City to 42.84 5.0 0. 4 0.7 7.0 55.94 
Spencer 8-20-78 33.32 5.0 0.4 0.7 7.0 46.42 
Denison 8-21-78 35.28 6.0 0.5 0.8 8.0 50.58 
Sioux City to 44.52 6.0 0.5 0.8 8.0 59.82 
Spencer 12- 14-78 34.72 6.0 0.5 0.8 8.0 50.02 
Denison 12-15-78 38.36 6.0 0.5 0.8 10.0 55.66 
Sioux City to 48.44 6.0 0.5 0.8 10.0 65.74 
Spencer 2-24-79 37.80 6.0 0.5 0.8 10.0 55.10 
Denison 2-25-79 38.92 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 57.22 
Sioux City to 49.00 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 67. 30 
Spencer 6-04-79 38.08 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 56 . 38 
Denison 6-05-79 39.48 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 57.78 
Sioux City to 49.56 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 67.86 
Spencer 7-27-79 38.64 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 56.94 
Denison 7-28-79 40.42 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 58. 72 
Sioux City to 50.74 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 69 . 04 
Spencer 9-13-79 39.56 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 57.86 
Denison 9-14-79 40.86 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 60.46 
Sioux City to 51.29 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 70.89 
Spencer 10-14-79 39.99 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 59.59 
Denison 10-15-79 44.24 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 63.84 
Sioux City to 55. 71 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 75.31 
Spencer 12-31-79 43.12 6.0 0.5 1.1 12 . 0 62.72 
"bil rates were obtained from Book of Grain Rates No. 16 West of 
the MississiEEi· (Chicago: Chicago Board of Trade Transportation Dept., 
January 2, 1976, and updated.) 
b Elevator and storage charges were obtained from personal communica-
tion with grain industry officials in Chicago. 
~erchandising margin is an assumed margin to cover operating costs 
at country elevators. Actual ~rgins will vary from time to time and 
from one area to another, depending on market conditions. 
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Soybeans 
Merchan-
Single Elevator Storage & Interest dising Total 
cara charge sh insuranceh on crop marginc costs 
43.80 5 . 0 0.4 2.8 9.0 61.00 
43 . 80 5.0 0.4 2.8 9.0 61.00 
43.80 5 . 0 0.4 2.8 9.0 61.00 
45 . 90 5.0 0.4 2.7 10.0 64.00 
45.90 5 . 0 0.4 2.7 10.0 64.00 
45.90 5 .0 0. 4 2.7 10.0 64.00 
47.70 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 67.50 
47.70 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 67.50 
47.70 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 67.50 
51.90 6.0 0 . 5 2.3 13.0 73.70 
51.90 6.0 0.5 2.3 13.0 73.70 
51.90 6.0 0.5 2.3 13.0 73.70 
52.50 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 75.50 
52.50 6.0 0.5 2.5 14 . 0 75.50 
52.50 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 75.50 
53.10 6 . 0 0.5 2. 5 14.0 76.10 
53.10 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 76.10 
53.10 6.0 0.5 2. 5 14.0 76.10 
54.36 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 77 .36 
54 . 36 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 77.36 
54.36 6.0 0 .5 2.5 14.0 77.36 
55.57 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 79.97 
55.57 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 79.97 
55.57 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 79.97 
59.69 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 84.09 
59.69 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 84.09 
59.69 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 84.09 
Table 3-2 . Estimated costs for delivery of corn and soybeans by rail 
from Southeast Iowa to approved futures delivery elevators 
in Chicago, 1977-79 in cents per bushel 
Corn 
Storage Merchan-
Time Single Elevator and Interest dising Total 
Origin interval · car8 chargesb insur. on croE marginC costs 
Burlington 1-07-77 26.32 5.0 0 . 4 0.8 6.0 38.52 
Davenport to 22.12 5.0 0.4 0.8 6.0 34.32 
Washington 2-21-78 24.64 5.0 0.4 0 . 8 6.0 36.84 
Burlington 2-22-78 27. 72 5.0 0.4 0.7 7.0 40.82 
Davenport to 23.24 5 . 0 0.4 0.7 7.0 36.34 
Washington 8-20-78 25.76 5.0 0 . 4 0.7 7.0 38.86 
Burlington 8-21-78 28.84 6.0 0.5 0.8 8.0 44 .14 
Davenport to 24.08 6.0 0.5 0.8 8 .0 39.38 
Washington 12-14-78 26.88 6.0 0.5 0.8 8.0 42.18 
Burlington 12-15-78 31.36 6 . 0 0 . 5 0.8 10.0 48.66 
Davenport to 26.32 6 . 0 0.5 0.8 10.0 43.62 
Washington 2-24-79 29.40 6.0 0.5 0.8 10.0 46.70 
Burlington 2-25-79 31.64 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 49 .94 
Davenport to 26.60 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 44.90 
Washington 6-04-79 29 .68 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 47.98 
Burlington 6-05-79 31.96 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 50.26 
Davenport to 26.88 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 45.18 
Washington 7-27-79 29.96 6.0 0.5 0 .8 11.0 48.26 
Burlington 7-28-79 32.11 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 50.41 
Davenport to 27 . 23 6.0 0.5 0.8 11.0 45.53 
Washington 9-13- 79 30.67 6 . 0 0.5 0.8 11.0 48.97 
Burlington 9-14-79 33.03 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 52.63 
Davenport to 27.82 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 47.42 
Washington 10-14-79 31.00 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 50.60 
Burlington 10-15-79 36.40 6.0 0.5 1.1 12.0 56.00 
Davenport to 30.52 6.0 0 . 5 1.1 12.0 50.12 
Washington 12-31-79 33.60 6.0 0.5 1.1 12 . 0 53.20 
~ail rates were obtained from Book of Grain Rates No. 16 West of 
the MississiEEi· (Chicago: Chicago Board of Trade Transportation Dept., 
January 2, 1976, and updated.) 
b Elevator and storage charges were obtained from personal communica-
tion with grain industry officials in Chicago. 
~erchandising margin is an assumed margin to cover operating costs 
at country elevators. Actual margins will vary from time to time and 
from one area to another, depending on market conditions. 
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Sol'.: beans 
Merchan-
Single Elevator Storage & Interest di sing Total 
car a chargesb insuranceb on croE marginc costs 
31.80 5.0 0.4 2.8 9.0 49.00 
27.00 5.0 0.4 2.8 9.0 44.20 
33.90 5.0 0.4 2.8 9.0 51.10 
33.30 5.0 0.4 2.7 10.0 51.40 
28 .50 5.0 0.4 2.7 10.0 46.60 
35.70 5.0 0.4 2.7 10.0 53.80 
34.50 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 54.30 
29.70 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 49.50 
37.20 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 57.00 
37 .50 6.0 0.5 2.3 13.0 59.30 
32.40 6.0 0.5 2.3 13.0 54.20 
40.50 6.0 0.5 2.3 13.0 62.30 
38.10 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 61.10 
32.70 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 55.70 
40.80 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 63.80 
38 . 70 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 61.70 
33.00 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 56.00 
41.40 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 64.40 
38.44 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 61.44 
32.86 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 55.86 
42.39 6.0 0.5 2.5 14.0 65.39 
40.05 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 63.05 
34.15 6.0 0 . 5 2.9 15.0 57.15 
42.84 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 65.84 
43.80 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 68.20 
37.50 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 61 . 90 
46.20 6.0 0.5 2.9 15.0 70.60 
Table 3-3. Estilllated coats for delivery of corn and soybeans by truck from 
Northwest lova to approved futures delivery elevators in Chicago, 
1977-79 in cents per bushel 
Corn 
Storage Merchan-
Origin 
Time Transpor- Transit Elevator and Interest dieing Total 
interval tation3 billingbchargesc insur.con crop margind cos ts 
Denison 1-01-77 
Sioux City to 
Spencer 2-21-78 
All cities 2-22-78 
to 
8-20-78 
All cities 8-21-78 
to 
12-14- 78 
All cities 12-15-78 
to 
2- 24-79 
All cities 2-25-79 
to 
9-13-79 
All cities 9-14-79 
to 
12-31-79 
29.00 
29.00 
29.00 
29 .00 
30.00 
30.00 
40.00 
40.00 
14 . 0 
14 . 0 
14.0 
15.0 
15 . 0 
17.0 
18.0 
20.0 
5. 0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
0. 4 
0. 4 
0.4 
0 .4 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
o. 7 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
1.1 
6.0 55.20 
6.0 55 . 20 
6.0 55.20 
7.0 57.10 
8.0 60.30 
10.0 64.30 
11.0 76.30 
12.0 79 .60 
8Transportation charges vere obtained from private co1111Dunication vith 
trucking industry officials. 
bTransit billing charges were calculated by taking the difference between 
the flat and proportional rail rates from Chicago to New York and were 
obtained through personal communication vith Chicago Board of Trade officials. 
cElevator and storage charges were obtained from personal communication 
vith grain industry officials in Chicago. 
~erchandising margin is an assumed margin to cover operating costs at 
country elevators. Actual margins vill vary from time to time and from one 
area to another, depending on market conditions. 
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So beans 
Merchan-
Transpor- Transit Elevator Storage & Interest dising Total 
tation8 billingb c hargesb insuranceC on cro~ margind costs 
29.00 15.0 5.0 0.4 2. 8 9.0 61 . 20 
29 . 00 15.0 5.0 0 .4 2.8 9.0 61.20 
29.00 15.0 5.0 0.4 2.8 9. 0 61.20 
29 . 00 16.0 5.0 0.4 2.7 10.0 63 . 10 
30.00 16.0 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 65 . 80 
30.00 18.0 6.0 0.5 2.3 13.0 69.80 
40.00 19 . 0 6 . 0 0. 5 2.5 14 . 0 82.00 
40.00 21.0 6 . 0 0.5 2.9 15. 0 85.40 
Table 3-4. Estimated costs for delivery of corn and soybeans by truck from 
Southeast Iowa ·to approved futures delivery elevators in Chicago, 
1977-79 in cents per bushel 
Corn 
Storage Merchan-
Origin 
Time Transpor- Transit Elevator and Interest disingd Total 
interval tationa billingbchargesc insur.con crop margin costs 
Burlington 1-01-77 
Davenport to 
Washington 2-21-78 
All cities 2-22-78 
to 
8-20-78 
All cities 8-21-78 
to 
12-14-78 
All cities 12-15-78 
to 
2-24-79 
All cities 2-25-79 
to 
9-13-79 
All cities 9-14-79 
to 
12-31-79 
29.00 
29.00 
29.00 
29.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
32.50 
14.0 
14 . 0 
14.0 
15.0 
15.0 
17.0 
18. 0 
20.0 
s.o 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
6.0 
6 . 0 
6.0 
6.0 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
:.4 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0 . 8 
0.8 
0.8 
1.1 
6.0 55,20 
6.0 55.20 
6.0 55.20 
7.0 57.10 
8.0 60.30 
10.0 64.30 
11.0 66.30 
12.0 72.10 
aTransportation charges were obtained from private connnunication with 
trucking industry officials. 
b Transit billing charges were calculated by taking the difference 
between the flat and proportional rail rates from Chicago to New York and 
were obtained through personal communication with Chicago Board of Trade 
officials. 
cElevator and storage charges were obtained from personal communication 
with grain industry officials in Chicago. 
~erchandising margin is an assutned margin to cover operating costs at 
country elevators. Actual margins will vary from time to time and from one 
area to another, depending on market conditions. 
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So beans 
Merchan-
Transpor- Transit Elevator Storage & Interest dising Total 
tation8 billingb chargesC insuranceC on cro2 margind costs 
29.00 15.0 5.0 0.4 2.8 9.0 61.20 
29 . 00 15. 0 s.o 0 . 4 2. 8 9.0 61.20 
29.00 15.0 5.0 0.4 2.8 9.0 61.20 
29.00 16.0 5 . 0 0. 4 2. l 10. 0 63.10 
30.00 16.0 6.0 0.5 2.3 11.0 65 . 80 
30.00 18.0 6 . 0 0. 5 2.3 13.0 69.80 
30.00 19.0 6.0 0.5 2.5 14 . 0 72 .00 
32.50 21.0 fi . O 0. 5 2.9 15.0 77.90 
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rates . Rail freight rates increased nine times during the three year 
period. 
Table 3-1 indicates the rail delivery cost basis for corn on 
July 1, 1979 averaged about 60 cents per bushel in Northwest Iowa. In 
other words, these costs suggest an incentive to deliver would have 
existed if Northwest Iowa cash corn prices received by the producers 
were lower than the 60 cent basis under the expiring futures contract 
during the final trading month. A wider basis could be expected 
prior to the delivery month, however. The rail delivery cost basis 
for soybeans in Northwest Iowa on July 1, 1979, averaged approximately 
76 cents per bushel. In Southeast Iowa (see Table 3-2) rail delivery 
costs ranged from 48 cents per bushel for corn to 61 cents for soy-
beans. 
Tables 3-3 and 3-4 indicate the truck delivery cost basis on 
July 1, 1979 averaged about 76 cents per bushel for corn and 82 cents 
for soybeans in Northwest Iowa. In Southeast Iowa (see Table 3-4) 
truck delivery cos t s ranged from approximately 66 cents per bushel 
f or corn to 72 cents for soybeans. 
Comparing the truck delivery costs to those for rail delivery, 
note that truck costs range from 6 to 18 cents per bushel higher than 
rail. For this reason, rail delivery expenses will be used for the 
delivery cost basis during the remainder of this analysis. Rail 
delivery would be a more economical delivery method than truck 
shipment. 
Tables 3-5 and 3-6 show a comparison of the rail delivery cost 
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46 
basis and the actual basis under nearby futures during the final 
trading month in the period 1974 through 1979 for both the Northwest 
and Southeast Iowa price reporting districts. From this comparison 
note that: (1) at no time in either district did the average actual 
corn basis exceed the average delivery cost basis; and (2) only 
during the August and November futures in 1974 and the May futures 
in 1978 did the average actual soybean basi~ P.Xceed the average 
delivery cost bas is. If transportation problems contributed to the 
wide soybean basis at these times, one would expect a wide corn basis 
to occur also . Since the soybean basis widened without a similar 
effect on the corresponding corn basis, this suggests that possible 
impediments to delivery in Chicago may have contributed to the wide 
soybean basis. 
These data indicate that in essentially all cases, there was no 
incentive for a hedger to deliver corn from Northwest and Southeast 
Iowa on futures contracts. However, on a few occasions, incentives 
for delivery of Iowa soybeans on futures contracts were indicated. 
From this analysis, it was concluded that delivery costs do set a 
lower limit on corn and in most cases on the Iowa soybean basis. 
Generally, the actual basis has run several cents less than the 
delivery cost basis. 
This analysis suggests that the actual basis patterns should be 
used when localizing prices in the future rather than the delivery 
cost basis. The historical basis patterns over the six-year study 
period, after adjustments for inflation, represented a better tool 
, 
47 
for localizing futures prices than the costs of delivering on futures 
contracts. 
Influence of Chicago Delivery Conditions on Iowa Basis 
In addition to lack of transportation, impediments to delivery 
at the futures delivery points may also affect local basis patterns. 
If it is impossible, or extremely difficult to deliver grain on 
futures contracts, the district basis figures can exceed the corre-
sponding delivery cos ts. 
The unusually wide soybean basis in 1974 and 1978 suggests a need 
to analyze Chicago basis behavior for evidence of possible impediments 
to delivery. An analysis of Chicago basis patterns will be presented 
in Chapter 4. 
48 
CHAPTER IV. CHICAGO BASIS BEHAVIOR 
AT CONTRACT MATURITY 
With the greater costs of delivery to St. Louis and Toledo, all 
deliveries on corn and soybean futures contracts from Iowa would 
logically be routed to Chicago under normal conditions . However, if 
serious transportation problems, grain handling difficulties, or lack 
of available storage space exist at Chicago elevators, this could 
prevent delivery of grain at that location to fulfill futures contracts. 
These conditions could cause a distorted relationship between cash and 
futures prices. In such cases, we would expect delivery on futures 
contracts to be made at St. Louis or Toledo, Ohio. 
In the preceding chapter, the Iowa basis was compared to the 
delivery cost basis from both Northwest and Southeast Iowa to Chicago . 
These results indicate that delivery costs and the threat of delivery 
have been effective in setting the lower limit on the local cor n basis . 
However, Iowa soybean basis patterns raise some doubt about the 
effectiveness of the threat of delivery in the soybean futures market . 
To enable the hedger to better understand delivery possibilities, the 
Chicago basis under expiring corn and soybean futures contracts was 
compiled for the last 25 days of trading before contract maturity . 
These results were compared to the costs of delivery on futures 
contracts at Chicago. 
As a framework for analyzing the Chicago basis, it is hypothesized 
that if the following three conditions are evident, then there ar e no 
major impediments to delivery present. These conditions are 
49 
as follows: 1 
(1) During the final month of trading before a particular futures 
contract expires, Chicago cash prices should differ from the 
price of the expiring futures contract for the same commodity 
by no more than the costs of delivery, except possibly for 
brief periods. 
(2) Cash prices during the final trading month should be expected 
to range above and below expiring futures contract prices 
with about equal frequency. 
(3) Variability of the Chicago basis against expiring futures 
contracts should gradually diminish during the final weeks of 
trading as the futures contract expiration date is reached. 
If delivery is possible or the threat of delivery is effective, 
one would expect the Chicago basis to be relatively stable and predict-
able as contract maturity approaches . If futures prices are above 
Chicago cash prices, traders would bid down futures prices by selling 
futures while then simultaneously buying local cash grain to deliver 
on the futures contract. This action would continue with futures prices 
being bid down and cash prices being bid up until the two prices are 
approximately equal. If, however, futures prices are below Chicago 
cash prices, traders would bid up futures prices by buying futures and 
~bert N. Wisner, Craig A. Chase and H. Alan Carver, "Analysis of 
Corn and Soybean Basis Patterns and Hedging Opportunities for Cash-Grain 
Producers by Price Reporting Districts in Iowa," report sponsored 
jointly by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and the Iowa Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, May 1980. 
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holding them for delivery until cash and futures prices are approxi-
mately equal. If no impediments to delivery exist, one would expect 
cash prices above and below expiring futures quotations to occur with 
about equal frequency . The price differences between the two markets 
might be slightly larger four to six weeks prior to contract expira-
tion, but with the difference smaller and less variable as contract 
maturity approaches. 
In this analysis, Chicago cash prices were obtained from the 
Chicago Board of Trade annual statistical summaries1 and the Grain 
Market News Branch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Futures 
prices were obtained from the Wall Street Journal and Iowa State 
University Market News office files. 
Chicago Corn Basis 
Figures 4-1 through 4-5 and Appendix Figures B-4 through B-8 
show the Chicago hopper car basis for corn in relation to the March, 
May and July futures contracts during the last 25 days of trading for 
the period 1975 through 1979. It should be noted that prior to 
November 1974, only box car prices were published on Chicago corn. 
Examples of box car quotes are shown in Appendix Figures B-1 through 
B-3. This analysis is based only on hopper car cash prices, since box 
car bids reflect growing obsolescence of box cars as a method of 
transporting grain. The reason for this obsolescence is that 
additional labor is required for loading and unloading boxcars; also, 
1 
Statistical Annual Chicago Board of Trade (Chicago: Board of 
Trade of the City of Chicago, 1974 and 1975). 
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56 
these cars have a much greater tendency to develop leaks in transit 
than the jumbo covered hopper cars. As a result, Chicago boxcar bids 
typically have been discounted several cents per bushel under grain 
shipped in hopper cars in recent years. 
Included in the basis charts are the costs incurred for making 
or taking delivery. The costs of making delivery on futures contracts 
include inspection, grading, interest, insurance, elevation and 
storage expenses, and are designated by a horizontal line below the 
zero line on the basis chart. The costs of taking delivery include a 
loadout charge along with weighing, inspection and grading, and are 
designated by the horizontal line above the zero line. 
The patterns shown in the previously mentioned figures indicate 
that variability of the Chicago hopper car corn basis during the last 
25 days of trading was relatively small at almost all times. One 
exception was in 1974 when the basis under the March futures about 
15 days before contract maturity was somewhat volatile. In comparing 
the differences among contracts, there appeared to be little difference 
in basis variability with the exception of the December futures. The 
December futures tended to be more variable at the beginning of the 
25 day period but during the remainder of the period it converged; 
within the delivery cost range in 1977 and 1979. The variability at 
the beginning of the period could be due to harvest pressures from 
large crops and limited storage facilities, lack of adequate 
transportation equipment and related conditions that affect the Chicago 
basis in late November. After the harvest has been completed, these 
57 
pressures tend to diminish rapidly and thus permit the Chicago corn 
basis to move back into line with delivery costs. 
It should be apparent after examining Figures 4-1 through 4-5 
that the three conditions specified at the beginning of this section 
generally have been met by the Chicago hopper car corn basis. For 
this reason, it can be concluded that delivery on corn futures 
contracts has generally proceeded smoothly and that no evidence of 
serious impediments to delivery exists. 
Chicago Soybean Basis 
Figures 4-6 through 4-11 and Appendix Figures B-9 and B-10 show 
the Chicago soybean basis for the May, July, August, and November 
futures contracts and their corresponding delivery costs at Chicago. 
Only one Chicago cash bid is published for soybeans, with n.o 
differentiation between hopper and box car bids. This may be explained 
by a high percentage of soybeans sold in Chicago cash markets that 
normally are delivered by truck. 
It is important to note that the grade specified in soybean 
futures contracts is No. 2 yellow, whereas Chicago cash soybeans are 
based on the No. 1 yellow grade . Futures contracts receive a three cent 
per bushel premium for No. 1 soybeans, whereas no premium or discount 
is taken if No. 2 soybeans are delivered on the contract. To take 
into account the difference in prices of grades, this analysis will 
adjust the costs of making delivery downward by the three cent difference 
due to the capability of purchasing a lower grade for delivery. The 
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costs of taking delivery are adjusted upward by three cents per bushel 
to reflect additional costs of moving up a grade comparable to cash 
prices. For example, if the Chicago costs of making delivery are nine 
cents per bushel, the adjusted net delivery costs will be six cents 
per bushel. 
Looking at Figure 4-6 note that the basis under the expiring May 
futures followed the expected pattern for the years 1974 and 1975. 
This pattern is similar to the patterns experienced for expiring corn 
futures contracts. However, the other years experienced an erratic 
basis pattern as the futures contracts expired. An example of this 
variability is the May futures during the last 25 days of trading in 
1977, as shown in Figure 4-7, when it ranged from 33 cents per bushel 
under the expiring contract to 6 under and expired at 17 under. 
During the same period of 1978 the comparable basis ranged from 33 to 
11 under, expiring at 24 under. It is apparent that during these two 
periods, an incentive to deliver existed. However, during both periods 
rapid fluctuations in the basis may have discouraged hedgers from 
attempting to make delivery. In 1979, the May basis reverted back to 
the expected pattern indicating no major impediments to deliver. 
Figures 4-8 through 4-11 show the basis behavior under other 
soybean futures contracts as they approached maturity. Data in these 
figures suggest delivery on soybean futures has proceeded much less 
smoothly than the corn futures. There were several instances when 
the soybean basis at contract expiration was wider than the corre-
sponding delivery costs. The soybean basis also tended to exhibit a 
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downward bias rather than a distribution above and below the zero line 
with equal frequency. 
If serious impediments to delivery occur at times, the Chicago 
basis could become wide and unpredictable, causing the local basis in 
Iowa and other areas to become distorted and wider than normal. This 
unpredictability could cause greater basis uncertainty on soybeans 
than on corn, making soybean hedging returns for producers more variable 
than on corn. Increased uncertainty l ikely would be compensated for 
by widening country elevator merchandising margins. For an example of 
this, note the increasing merchandising margins in the Chapter 3 
discussion on total delivery costs to Chicago. Also, it should be 
noted that in the three instances where the Iowa soybean basis exceeded 
delivery costs, the Chicago basis also exceeded its corresponding 
delivery costs. 
Reasons for greater soybean basis variability 
Possible reasons for greater soybean basis variability than corn 
include dif f erences in levels of stocks in deliverable positions and 
numbers of limit price moves during the last 25 days prior to contract 
expiration. In addition, delivery at times may have been discouraged 
by transit billing requirements as well as a lack of alternate soybean 
delivery points outside Chicago until September 1979. 
Stocks of corn and soybeans in deliverable positions are listed in 
Table 4-1 for the dates shown for the period 1974 through 1979. These 
data show the amount of grain in approved warehouses in Chicago and 
thus available for immediate delivery on futures contracts. As 
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deliverable supplies decrease, the chance of an erratic basis behavior 
at contract maturity would logically increase. The reasoning behind 
this observation is that when deliverable stocks are large, delivery on 
futures contracts should be able to occur with relative ease. Small 
stocks may lead to more erratic basis behavior as the market attempts 
to entice the equilibrium amount of grain into deliverable positions 
from outlying areas. 
For example, the Chicago basis under the May futures during the 
last 25 days prior to expiration in 1975, as shown in Figure 4-6, was 
somewhat volatile. The low deliverable stocks (870,000 bushels of 
soybeans) may have been a contributing factor to this pattern. Erratic 
basis behavior towards the end of trading in the 1978 May soybean 
futures also may have been caused by this condition. However, the May 
1977 Chicago basis was erratic although the deliverable stocks were 
large at 11,944,000 bushels. The unusually low stocks of corn in July 
1977 should also have contributed to an erratic basis pattern . However, 
looking at Figure 4-3, the Chicago corn basis was relatively stable 
and well within the delivery cost constraint at contract maturity. 
These results indicate basis behavior is not completely related to size 
of deliverable stocks. Thus, other determining factors may be involved. 
Limit price moves of an expiring futures contract may cause an 
erratic basis to occur. Limit moves are defined here as a 30 cent 
per bushel movement up or down from the previous trading days' closing 
futures price for soybeans along with a 10 cent per bushel movement for 
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1 
corn. These daily price limits went into effect in October 1976. 
For most trading days prior to October 1976, the maximum daily price 
limit for soybeans was 20 cents per bushel, although the limit was 
raised or removed in some instances through action by the CBOT . On 
limit move days, elevators often take "price protection" due to 
uncertainty about the following day's price action. This action 
could cause an unusually wide basis to occur at these times. 
The number of limit moves for the May, July, and August futures 
contracts during the last 25 days prior to contrac t expiration for the 
period 1974 through 1979 is listed in Table 4-2. The larger the 
number of limit moves, the more erratic the basis pattern is likely to 
be. For example, during the last 25 days prior to the expiration of 
the July 1977 futures contract, 12 limit moves occurred. Looking at 
Figure 4-8, the July 1977 Chicago basis exhibited an erratic behavior. 
Also, the July 1978 Chicago basis was stable and no limit moves occurred 
during the last 25 trading days on this contract . However, the 1979 
July Chicago basis exhibited an erratic behavior with the number of 
limit moves being relatively low at 5. All five of the limit moves 
occurred before July 6, 1979. The basis pattern remained relatively 
erratic from July 6 until the expiration of the contract. This would 
1 
Currently the daily limits on price moves are thirty cents per 
bushel and ten cents per bushel, respectively, for soybeans and corn. 
However, if limit price moves occur in the same direction for three 
successive trading days on three or more contracts in the same crop 
marketing year, the limits are increased to forty-five and fifteen cents, 
respectively, for soybeans and corn for the next three days of trading. 
In the absence of continued limit moves during this three-day period, 
the daily price limits then revert back to their original level. 
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indicate basis behavior is not completely related to number of limit 
moves. 
The delivery of soybeans to fulfill a futures contract was 
discussed in Chapter 3. It was pointed out that trade sources indicate 
a high percentage of the soybeans moved into Chicago are shipped by 
truck . If truck soybeans are delivered on futures contracts, a transit 
billing requirement must be met. Transit billing, as an additional 
cost to truck delivery, may discourage delivery on futures contracts at 
times. When this occurs, it may also result in an erratic basis 
pattern. 
One alternative to encourage greater stability in the Chicago soy-
bean basis would be to add an additional delivery point(s). This was 
done beginning with the September 1979 futures contract, although 
additional time will be needed before its impact can be accurately 
evaluated. 1 Heifner, along with additional delivery points, suggests 
the possibility of allowing for a wider range of grades to be delivered 
2 on futures contracts to expand the deliverable supply. Expansion of 
deliverable supplies would increase the threat of delivery and could 
contribute to a more stable basis pattern as contract expiration is 
1
For a discussion of alternative points and their potential role in 
futures markets, see Robert N. Wisner and J. Marvin Skadberg, "A Proposal 
for Multiple Corn and Soybean Futures Delivery Points," Iowa State 
Cooperative Extension Service, M-1068, August 1973. 
2 
For an excellent presentation of possible solutions to erratic 
basis patterns associated with futures markets, see Richard G. Heifner, 
"Report on a Study of the March 1979 Chicago Wheat Futures Contract," 
unpublished paper by the Agricultural Market Service of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture sponsored by the Ninety-sixth Congress of the 
United States. 
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approached. This would allow expiring futures to more accurately 
reflect the "true" commercial value of the commodity and would improve 
predictability of hedging returns. 
Heifner also calls for the setting and enforcing of more stringent 
position limits during the delivery period, with the position limits 
1 adjusted weekly depending upon the deliverable supply. As a general 
guide, it seems reasonable to require that positions which individual 
traders are permitted to hold, not exceed the deliverable supply. For 
commodities whose deliverable stocks are regularly estimated, a suggested 
procedure would be to limit each trader to no more than one third of the 
deliverable supply during the last five trading days prior to contract 
expiration. 2 If individual "traders" positions exceed quantities readily 
available for delivery, an erratic basis pattern could occur and 
conditions for a potential market "squeeze" would be present. A squeeze 
exists when one or a few traders are in the position to manipulate the 
market price. Their open positions may be on the long or short side of 
the market, although the long position is more common. In this case, 
the squeezer holds his long position and calls for delivery of quantities 
that are larger than the deliverable supply. Traders who are in short 
1 A position limit may be defined as the maximum number of outstanding 
contracts a speculator can hold at any given time. Currently, the posi-
tion limit on corn and soybean futures contracts as prescribed by exchange 
rules and enforced by the CFTC is a total of three million bushels per 
trader. This limit applies to the total of all outstanding contracts held 
in all futures contract months for each individual commodity. Position 
limits on corn and soybeans are not applied to hedgers. 
2 
Richard G. Heifner, "Report on a Study of the March 1979 Chicago 
Wheat Futures Contract," p. 20. 
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positions must then pay a higher price to release themselves from 
their positions or to transport the commodity from distant locations. 
Heifner expresses the view that variable position limits could 
allow futures prices to approach their "true" value at delivery time. 
This would permit the market to more effectively serve its hedging 
function without large physical deliveries being made. 1 
The next chapter deals with the marketing alternatives associated 
with post-harvest periods. An in-depth look at the profitability of 
storage hedges will be presented. 
l Ibid . , p. 22. 
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CHAPTER V. INTERTEMPORAL PRICE RELATIONSHIPS AND 
THEIR EFFECTS ON STORAGE HEDGING RETURNS 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a storage hedge is accomplished by 
selling futures contracts at harvest and storing the cash crop until 
some later date. For producers who store on the farm, the grain 
would typically be held until late spring of the following year when 
the basis historically narrows. At that time, the hedge would be 
removed by simultaneously selling the cash crop and buying back futures 
contracts to close out the futures position. 
Intertemporal price relationships (i.e., price relationships or \ 
price variations through time) are based on the demand for storage and 
the cost of carrying the crop from harvest to some later date when it 
is sold. These price relationships are an important influence on 
potential returns to producers for storage hedges. The costs of 
carrying the crop can be defined as the expenses incurred in holding a 
commodity of a given quality at a specific location for different 
\ 
delivery dates. These expenses consist of three main elements: storage, 
insurance, and interest on the crop. The return to cover storage 
expenses is reflected in price differences between different futures 
contract maturities and in seasonal basis changes. 
Intertemporal Price Relationships 
An analysis of storage costs suggests that the cash price for a 
storable conunodity at harvest should be below the December futures 
price by the cost of carrying the crop from harvest to December. In 
the same way, the price of the December futures contract should be less 
74 
than March by the cost of carrying the crop from December to March, 
and similarly for other futures prices through the July contract. 
Table 5-1 shows the spreads or differences between successive futures 
contract months on selected days during the 1978-79 marketing year. 
These spreads are the potential returns being offered for storage by 
the futures market at any point in time for the period shown. They 
often are referred to in the grain trade as carrying charges. 
The theory of the carrying charge is based on the following 
conditions: (1) storable commodities are produced at one time of the 
year but are consumed fairly evenly throughout the marketing year; 
(2) there are costs incurred in carrying and maintaining the quality 
of inventories; and (3) there are essentially no costs incurred in 
holding a futures contract. 1 Due to these facts it follows that cash 
prices should increase in relation to futures as the marketing year 
progresses. 
In the example in Table 5-1, the spread between the December and 
March corn futures in October of 1978 was 10 cents per bushel. The 
hedger would need to decide if this spread is large enough to cover his 
costs of storage from December to March. If the spread exceeds his 
expected costs, he may wish to hedge his grain and store it into the 
following spring. Thus, carrying charges in futures markets will 
affect hedging decisions. Also note the March-May, May-July, and July-
September corn spreads in 1978-79, as shown in Table 5-1. These 
1
Thomas A. Hieronymus, Economics of Futures Trading (New York: 
Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., 1971), p. 153. 
75 
Table 5-1. Corn and soybean futures spreads, Chicago Board of Trade a 
1978-79 
Corn Soybeans 
Dec.- Mar.- May- July- Nov.- Jan.- Mar.- May- July-
1978 Mar. May July Se2t. Jan. Mar. May July SeEt· 
Oct. 5 10 6 3 2 7 7 3 1 -25 
12 10 6 2 0 5 7 1 1 -31 
19 10 7 4 3 9 9 5 -1 -25 
26 9 7 3 1 8 10 3 2 -31 
Nov. 2 10 6 4 2 12 11 6 1 - 34 
9 9 7 3 2 11 13 6 3 -24 
16 10 7 4 2 13 12 6 5 -29 
22 11 7 4 1 10 8 2 -29 
30 11 8 5 1 13 7 4 -31 
Dec. 7 12 8 6 1 13 7 2 -32 
14 12 8 5 1 12 7 3 -28 
21 8 6 4 15 9 4 -35 
28 8 6 3 16 10 5 -29 
1979 
Jan . 4 8 5 3 13 8 6 -26 
11 8 5 2 13 7 5 -27 
18 8 5 2 12 9 6 -31 
25 9 6 1 10 8 -32 
Feb. 1 8 5 2 13 9 -32 
8 9 5 2 15 8 - 51 
15 10 6 4 15 9 -54 
22 11 6 4 16 8 -60 
Mar . 1 11 7 3 16 12 - 44 
8 7 5 3 16 9 -41 
15 5 3 3 13 8 -42 
22 3 2 7 -46 
29 4 3 9 -45 
Apr. 5 4 3 9 -37 
12 4 3 13 -28 
19 4 2 14 -33 
26 6 4 15 -25 
May 3 5 2 17 - 15 
10 4 3 17 -12 
17 5 2 16 - 6 
24 3 - 6 
31 3 - 6 
June 7 5 - 3 
14 7 12 
21 3 - 7 
28 4 0 
July 5 1 3 
12 1 2 
19 0 - 5 
aSource: Futures spreads were calculated by taking the difference 
between Chicago Board of Trade closing futures prices obtained from the 
Wall Street Journal. 
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spreads generally were too small to cover full cormnercial costs of 
carrying the crop from March through September profitably. 
In examining corn and soybean futures spreads, it is important to 
note that September does not always fit into the intertemporal pattern 
normally shown by other contracts. September is a transitional month, 
coming before the new crop is readily available, but after some parts 
of the country have begun to harvest corn and soybeans. In some years, 
the market offers corn and soybean hedgers a positive return for 
storage from July to September, while in other years the return is 
negative. The return in individual years depends heavily on the level 
of old crop supplies, crop maturity, and the expected timing of the 
harvest. :.<Jt of 
t!(' j \ The difference or spread between two quoted futures prices for 
different delivery dates can also be referred to as the price of or the 
return for storage. This price difference is a price of storage, 
determined in a free market through competition between those who seek 
t id . i 1 o prov e or acquire serv ces. The price of storage will vary from 
time to time, depending on the level of supply and demand for storage. 
Supply and demand for storage 
The demanders of storage consist of a group of firms who desire 
to have stocks carried for them from a period in which they do not 
intend to consume them, into another period, in which the stocks will 
1ifolbrook Working, "The Theory of Price of Storage," American 
Economic Review 39, No. 6 (December 1949):1254T62. 
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1 be consumed. The demand for storage of a conunodity can be derived 
from the demand for its consumption, under the assumption that all 
variables affecting consumption except price are exogenously determined. 
2 
The demand function for consumption in period t may be written: 
where pt is price in period t and Ct is consumption in period t. The 
subscripts indicate that the variables may shift over time. With a 
fixed demand function, the price in period t is determined by the 
intersection of the supply and demand for the commodity. This can be 
written: 
where st-1 represents inventories at the end of period t-1, xt is 
production in period t, and St is stocks at the end of t. In other 
words, at the equilibrium price, consumption equals the change in 
supplies during the period. For simplicity, it is assumed that current 
and subsequent production and inventories are known, 
In the same way, the price of the commodity in period t+l can be 
written: 
If St increases, this would shift the commodity supply function to the 
~ichael J . Brennan, "The Supply of Storage," American Economic 
Review 48, No. 1 (March 1958):51. 
2
Ibid. 
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left in period t, raising p , assuming all other conditions remain 
t 
constant. At the s ame time, the commodity supply function for period 
t+l will shift to the right, lowering Pt+l' again assUJD1:ng all other 
conditions remain constant. The demand for storage can now be 
expressed as follows: 
or 
The partial derivative for this equation with respect to St is negative. 
Thi s means that with St-l known and Xt, Xt+l' and St+l exogenously 
determined, the price spread increases a s St decreases. In other words, 
the demand for storage is negatively related to the price spread. With 
all other conditions remaining constant, the demand for storage will 
shift upward (or increase) due to: (1) an increase in production in t; 
(2) a decrease in production in t+l; or (3) an increase in stocks 
carried out of t+l. 1 
The supply of storage refers to the supply of conunodities as 
inventories, rather than the supply of storage space. 2 A firm 
attempting to maximize net revenue will provide additional storage of a 
commodity until the net marginal cost per unit of time just equals the 
expected change in price per unit of time. The net marginal cost of 
1 
Ibid., p. 52. 
2 Ibid., p. 51 . 
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storage need not be positive. 
According to Figure 5-1, there is a large segment of the storage 
supply curve that is in the negative region. In other words, storage 
will be supplied even if futures price spreads are negative. This 
may be due partly to the fact that most costs of grain storage are 
fixed in the short-run. Also, owners of storage facilities usually 
are engaged in other enterprises such as merchandising or processing, 
and maintain storage facilities to support these activities. For 
this reason, costs of storage may be charged to the other segments of 
1 the business which remain profitable. Working also points out that 
all goods possess a "convenience yield. 112 The marginal yield of these 
stocks falls sharply with an increase in stocks above "requirements" 
and may rise very sharply with a reduction below "requirements. 113 
The convenience yield is attributed to the advantage, in terms of 
lower cost and less delay, of being able to keep regular customers 
satisfied and to take advantage of a rise in demand and price without 
changing production schedules. 4 This explains why some inventories 
are carried even if the apparent return from storage as reflected by 
futures price spreads is zero or negative. 
The net marginal cost of storage can be defined as the marginal 
1nolbrook Working, "The Theory of Price of Storage," p. 260. 
2
Ibid . 
3 
Nicholas Kaldor, "Speculation and Economic Stability," Review of 
Economic Studies 7 (1939-40) :4. 
4 
Michael J . Brennan, "The Supply of Storage," p. 53. 
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0 quantity stored 
Figure 5-1. Storage supply function 
s 
F 
0 --~~~~~~~--................ ~~~~~~ 
Figure 5-2. Equilibrium supply and demand for 
storage 
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outlay on physical storage plus a marginal risk aversion factor minus 
1 the marginal convenience yield on stocks . The total outlay on 
physical storage consists of storage, handling charges, interest, and 
insurance. For any single firm the total outlay may increase at 
either a constant or an increasing rate. However, at the industry 
level, the marginal outlay may be approximately constant until ware-
house capacity is al.most fully utilized. Beyond this level, the 
marginal outlay would be expected to rise at an increasing rate. 
Based on these conditions, a theoretical supply of storage, along 
with the marginal outlay and marginal yield are shown in Figure 5-1. 
The curve Mey is a marginal convenience yield while Mo is the marginal 
outlay . If stocks are small, Mey is larger than Mo. Under these 
conditions, storage will be supplied at a negative price. With a 
competitive industry , SS in Figure 5-1 will be the storage supply 
function . The expected return for storage is the difference between 
present price and the future price, while SS is the net marginal cost 
of s torage. 
The intersection of the supply and demand for storage is the 
equilibrium point, determining the price spread as shown in Figure 5-2. 
The difference between pt and Pt+l must just equal the net marginal 
storage cost between the two periods. At this point, the price spread 
will be F, with Q being quantity stored as shown in Figure 5-2. Price 
and quantity in each period is determined by the connnodity supply and 
82 
demand. The price difference as determined in Figure 5-2 is the 
return for storage. 
Figure 5-3 shows the supply and demand for a commodity in periods 
t and t+l. The equilibrium points marked by the intersection of the 
supply and demand curve represent the optimum quantity and price for 
ea ch period. The difference between the equilibrium prices of the 
two periods (pt+l - pt) represents the return for storage. 
/ ·. The preceding models were presented as a framework for better 
understanding how future price spreads are determined and how returns 
for storage vary with current and expected future market conditions. 
b:nverse carrying charges 
"""= 
At times, prices for deferred futures contracts are below prices 
of the nearby futures months. In this case the market reflects what 
is known as an "inverse carrying charge. 111 This type of intertemporal 
price relationship is illustrated by the spread between the July and 
September soybean futures contracts throughout the 1978-79 marketing 
year, as shown in Table 5-1. It should be noted that this July-
September relationship is a connnon occurrence. A more unusual inverse 
carrying charge is reflected in the May-July spread on October 19, 1978. 
Inverse carrying charges generally are characterized by: (1) s trong 
current demand for the commodity; (2) limited producer marketings; and 
(3) expectations that demand will decline and marketings will increase 
1ifolbrook Working, "Theory of the Inverse Carrying Charge in 
Futures Markets," Journal of Farm Economics 30, No. 1 (Feb. 1948):1-28. 
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later in the marketing year. In effect, demand for storage is limited 
and Working's "convenience yield" is influencing price spreads at such 
times. Producer storage hedges under inverse carrying charge 
conditions generally would not be profitable, since the market would 
be reflecting negative returns for storage. Under such conditions the 
~ 
market is indicating it wants the commodity now rather than later. 
With this background on factors influencing futures price spreads --
and storage returns~ let us turn to an evaluation of storage hedging 
returns in Northwest and Southeast Iowa. 
Storage Hedging Results 
The main purposes of a storage hedge are to take advantage of basis 
improvement and potential increases in returns from the crop, while 
protecting oneself from the risk of lower prices during the storage 
period. One problem faced by producers who hedge is to determine the 
optimum time to place and lift the storage hedge. During the marketing 
years from 1974 through 1979, the ideal timing of the storage hedge 
varied slightly from year to year, district to district, and between 
crops depending on market conditions. To maximize gross returns, as 
shown earlier, the hedge should be placed when basis is wide, and 
lifted when it is narrow. 
Figures 5-4 through 5-7 and Appendix Tables C-1 and C-2 show 
storage hedge basis figures in cents under July futures. The figures 
reveal the July basis patterns for the 1977-78 and 1978-79 marketing 
years while the 1974-75 through 1978-79 marketing year patterns are 
shown in the appendix tables. For instance , the optimum time to place 
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a storage hedge for corn in Northwest Iowa would have been the first 
week of October in the 1977- 78 marketing year, and in the fourth week 
of October for the 1978- 79 marketing year. 
In soybeans, the timing of the hedge for these two marketing 
years would have been in the first week of October and fir st week of 
November respectively. Southeast Iowa differed somewhat from the 
Northwest district during thi.s period, with the optimum time to place 
a storage hedge for corn being in the first week of October in the 
1977-78 marketing year, and the third week of October for the 1978- 79 
marketing year. A soybean storage hedge as with the Northwest 
district , would have been placed in the first week of October and 
first week of November respectively. The maximum gross returns that 
could have been received from storage hedges during the peri od 1974 
through 1979 for the two districts are shown in a later sect ion of 
this chapter. 
The seasonal patter ns shown in Figures 5-4 through 5-7 and 
Appendix tables C-1 and C-2 reveal a general upward basis movement 
from harvest until the following spring . This seasonal pattern would 
be a major factor in determining the timing of storage hedges. 
Although the basis movements between years, districts, and crops 
varied somewhat, the general tendencies remain similar. Looking at 
Figures 5-4 through 5- 7 it is obvious that all years are not t he s ame. 
There exist year-to-year variations in harvest lows and post- harvest 
basis recovery as storage and transportation situations change, 
raising the basis into t he following spring. 
90 
In this analysis, potential hedging returns were analyzed for 
three different lengths of storage; three, six, and approximately 
eight months. Hedges were assumed to be placed at the widest harvest-
time basis, then lifted after twelve and twenty-four weeks for the 
three and six month storage periods, respectively. The eight month 
hedges were lifted either on the thirty-six week of storage or the 
last week of June, whichever came first. In each case, hedging returns 
were calculated using July futures prices. 
Local supply and demand along with transportation conditions can 
cause the local basis to vary from year to year. For example, if the 
corn futures basis in October is 90 cents under July and the supply of 
corn seems likely to exceed available storage space, this would 
indicate that the basis may become wider than the current 90 cents. 
Under these conditions, local elevators would be expected to begin 
buying corn and storing it on the ground, with the basis being 
depressed further to cover the risks of quality deterioration. 
In the following spring, suppose the normal Southeast basis is 
40 cents under July at this time. If local demand exceeds local 
supply, hedging returns probably can be increased by holding the grain 
until the basis narrows further before lifting the hedge. 
Corn hedging results 
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 show the maximum gross returns available from 
hedging programs with three and six month storage, and storage into 
late June. Hedging returns also are compared to the increase in cash 
prices during the same periods for both the Northwest and Southeast 
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price reporting districts. Hedging returns were calculated by taking 
the difference between the basis under July futures at the peak harvest 
period and the basis under July futures at the time the hedge was 
lifted. The unhedged returns were calculated by taking the difference 
in the cash prices available at peak harvest and at the time the hedge 
was lifted. 
Looking at the Northwest and Southeast districts, average hedging 
returns were moderately above unhedged returns. For example, in 
Northwest Iowa for each of the three storage periods, the average 
storage hedging returns were 22 to 24 cents above unhedged returns. 
Southeast Iowa shows a 9 to 18 cent advantage of hedged over unhedged 
returns. Year-to-year variability was measured by the range between 
the highest and lowest return over the five marketing years. Vari-
ability of hedging returns during all three storage periods was less 
than the variability of returns associated with unhedged storage. 
For instance, in Northwest Iowa as shown in Table 5-2, variability of 
returns from hedging was 50 to 116 cents lower than returns from 
unhedged storage. In Southeast Iowa, the difference ranged from 23 
to 67 cents. These results indicate a producer could have increased 
average price and decreased variability of returns through hedging as 
compared to storing unhedged corn. 
It should be noted that four of the last five years studied have 
been characterized by increasing carryover stocks, large crops, and 
inadequate transportation and storage space. These conditions tend 
to cause a wide basis at harvest, thus increasing the potential 
94 
returns available from hedging. Returns from hedging might be lower 
than unhedged storage in years of declining carryover stocks. 
Both the hedging returns and the unhedged returns for all three 
s torage periods for Southeast Iowa were slightly larger than Northwest 
Iowa. This may be due partly to differences in modes of transporta-
tion used. 
The variability of the hedging returns for the three month period 
in both districts was less than the two longer storage periods. Also, 
the year-to-year variability of unhedged returns increased sub-
stantially as the length of s torage increased. 
Corn storage costs and returns 
Storage costs as shown in Table 5-4 consist of: interest, 
shrinkage, drying, storage, handling, and quality deterioration. The 
largest component in storing for three months is the storage cost 
incurred in storing the crop either at the elevator or on the farm. 
For on-farm storage, this component is fixed and need not be 
considered in the storage decisions once the investment in storage 
facilities has been made. All other components of storage costs are 
variable. 
The second largest component is the interest cost involved when 
borrowed funds are used for a longer time in the business than would 
be necessary if the crop were sold at harvest. If borrowed funds are 
not used in the business, this component would be the income foregone 
by not selling the crop and investing the funds to earn interest. The 
other components are those costs incurred to store the crop beyond 
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96 
harvest without spoilage. An additional cost in storing on-farm is 
the extra handling needed to move the crop in and out of the farm 
storage facilities. Although costs varied slightly during the period 
studied here, 1978-79 costs will be used as a general indicator of 
net returns available for storing and hedging Iowa grain. 
Comparisons of the net returns from hedges and the costs of 
storage for the 1978-79 marketing year are shown in Table 5-5. These 
comparisons indicate corn that was stored at the elevator for the 
three month storage hedge provided net returns greater than the two 
longer periods, although a net loss still occurred. On-farm stored 
corn received net returns above fixed costs for all three storage 
periods with the three month storage hedge in the Northwest and six 
month storage hedges in the Southeast maximizing return over variable 
costs. 
Soybean hedging results 
Tables 5-6 and 5-7 show the maximum gross returns available from 
hedging programs with three and six month storage, and storage into 
late June. The unhedged storage returns are increases in cash prices 
during the same periods for both the Northwest and Southeast price 
reporting districts. 
Comparing hedged and unhedged returns, neither program has a 
consistent price advantage over the other. Io Northwest Iowa, average 
hedged returns were 6 to 43 cents larger than unhedged returns for 
three and six-month storage while unhedged returns held a 2 cent 
advantage for eight months storage. Results from Southeast Iowa showed 
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average hedged returns were 28 cents larger in the three month storage 
program, unhedged returns held a 24 cent advantage for eight months 
storage, and the six month storage returns virtually the same. 
Variability of returns as measured by the range between the 
highest and lowest return over the five marketing year period, revealed 
that hedging returns during all three storage periods varied sub-
stantially less than unhedged returns. For example, in Southeast Iowa 
as shown in Table 5-7, variability of returns from hedging was 97 to 
301 cents lower than returns from unhedged storage. In Northwest 
Iowa the difference ranged from 85 to 377 cents. 
Although a producer would have reduced his average return in some 
types of hedging programs, the reduced variability of returns might 
be a compensating factor, particularly for the individual with limited 
financial risk-bearing ability. The individual producer in choosing 
between hedged and unhedged storage should review his ability to absorb 
the risk of negative storage returns. 
As with corn, both the hedging returns and unhedged returns for 
all three storage periods for Southeast Iowa were larger than Northwest 
Iowa possibly due to transportation and market conditions. The vari-
ability of the hedging returns for the three month period in both 
districts was less than the two larger periods. Also, the variability 
of unhedged returns increased substantially from three to six months, 
then increased further for eight months storage in Northwest Iowa, 
but decreased slightly in Southeast Iowa. 
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Soybean costs and returns 
Soybean storage costs as shown in Table 5-8 consist of: interest, 
storage, handling, and quality deterioration. The largest component 
in storing soybeans is the interest cost. Interest costs ranged from 
17 cents per bushel for three months storage to 45 cents per bushel for 
eight months storage. The second largest component is the storage 
cost incurred in storing the crop either at the elevator or on the 
farm. For on-farm storage, this component is fixed. All other costs 
are variable. Handling costs and quality deterioration are explained 
in a previous section. 
Comparisons of the net returns from hedges and the costs of 
storage for the 1978-79 marketing year are shown in Table 5-5. These 
comparisons indicate soybeans that were stored at the elevator for 
the three month storage hedge provided net returns greater than the 
two longer periods, although a net loss still occurred. With the 
exception of the three month storage hedge in the Southeast, all 
hedging program returns covered fixed costs for on-farm stored 
soybeans. The three month storage hedge in both districts maximized 
returns over variable costs and minimized net losses. 
Implications for Producer Marketing Strategies 
Hedging offered a potentially important role for producers in 
marketing stored corn during the 1974-79 period. It would have 
generated increased returns and decreased variability compared to 
unhedged returns. Hedging offered a less important potential role in 
marketing soybeans. In this case, returns were limited in several 
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instances with hedging returns being less than those from unhedged 
storage. However, variability from hedging returns was substantially 
less than unhedged storage and could be an important consideration 
for farm operators with limited risk-bearing ability. 
It is important to note that if the costs of storage incurred in 
the 1978-79 marketing year were typical throughout the 1974-79 period, 
hedging returns generally would not cover the full costs of storing 
corn and soybeans for the time periods studied here. The next chapter 
deals with new crop pricing results including preharvest hedging and 
forward contracting. 
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CHAPTER VI. NEW CROP PRICING 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, forward contracting is accomplished 
when a producer enters into a written agreement with an elevator locking 
in a negotiated price for delivery of a specified product at some 
specified future time. Forward contracting alternatives analyzed here 
are those which involve locking in of a price for harvest delivery. 
An alternative new crop pricing method involves use of a preharvest 
hedge . Preharvest hedging is accomplished by selling futures contracts 
during the growing season. When the producer harvests his crops, he 
then simultaneously sells his cash crop and buys back his futures 
commitment. A loss from a decrease in cash prices during the hedging 
period will be about offset by a gain in futures prices and vice versa . 
New Crop Basis 
In choosing between these two new crop pricing methods, it is first 
essential to analyze the new crop basis . The new crop basis can be 
defined as the difference between the local cash price at harvest and 
the December futures price for corn, or the November futures price for 
soybeans on any given day. New crop contracting bids for harvest 
delivery are published daily by the Marketing Division of the Iowa 
Department of Agriculture, generally from mid-spring or early summer 
through September. The basis used in these bids reflects expectations 
of the grain trade as to what the local and national market conditions 
wjJ.l be at harvest. 
New crop bids were first reported by the Marketing Division by 
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Iowa districts in 1976; thus only four years of contracting prices were 
available for this study. Information on new crop basis patterns is 
essential to producers in deciding whether to forward contract with an 
elevator, use preharvest hedging on one of the commodity exchanges or 
cash sell at harvest. As a framework for decision making, the basis on 
forward contracts versus the likely basis and timing of seasonal price 
movements for both hedging and contracting will be examined here. In 
general, forward contracting would be more advantageous than hedging if 
the basis in such contracts is smaller than the expected harvest-time 
basis. 
New crop basis patterns are listed in Figures 6-1 through 6-8 and 
Tables 6-1 and 6-2 for the Northwest and Southeast districts for the 
1976-79 period. These data show the new crop basis in forward contracts 
until harvest begins, and the cash basis under the December and November 
futures for corn and soybeans respectively, from harvest-time until the 
expiration of the futures contracts . Tables 6-3 through 6- 6 show 
comparisons of prices received from forward contracts for harvest 
delivery and preharvest hedges during early June, mid-July, mid-August, 
and mid-September, and the average harvest prices received for the 
period 1976 through 1979 for Northwest and Southeast Iowa . 
New Crop Corn Pricing Results 
Comparisons of forward contracting, preharvest hedging and harvest-
time corn sales are presented in Tables 6-3 and 6-4. Comparing average 
returns from contracting to those received from hedging, note that 
average contracting prices were within 1 to 3 cents per bushel of the 
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Forward contracting basis Harvest and post- harvest cash basis 
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Figure 6-1. Weekly Northwest Iowa new crop corn basis, 
1976 and 1977 cents under December futures 
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Forward cont racting basis Harvest and post-harvest cash basis 
July August September October November 
Figure 6-3. Weekly Northwest Iowa new crop soybean 
basis, 197~ and 1977 cents under 
November futures 
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Figure 6-5. Weekly Southeast Iowa new crop corn basis, 1976 
and 1977 cents under December futures 
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Forvard contracting basis Harvest and pos t -harvest cash basis 
July August September October November 
Figure 6-7 . Weekly Southeast Iowa new crop soybean 
basis, 1976 and 1977 cents under 
November futures 
~
 
~
 
M
 
~
 
u ~
 
~
 ~ ~
 
~
 c ~ ¢ u c ~ u 
1
0
 
2
0
 
F
o"
'°
'a
rd
 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
 b
a
si
s 
H
ar
v
es
t 
an
d 
p
o
st
-h
a
rv
e
st
 c
as
h
 b
a
a
is
 
3
0
 
4
0
 
50
 F
ig
u
re
 6
-8
. 
W
ee
kl
y 
S
o
u
th
ea
st
 I
ow
a 
ne
w
 
cr
o
p
 s
oy
b
ea
n
 b
a
si
s
, 
19
78
 a
nd
 1
97
9 
ce
n
ts
 
u
n
d
er
 N
ov
em
be
r 
fu
tu
re
s 
.....
. 
.....
. 
V
J 
114 
Table 6-1. Weekly Northwest Iowa new crop basis , 1976-79a 
Month Corn Soybeans 
Yea r and week (Dec. basis) (Nov. basis) 
1976: July 1 44 52 
2 45 54 
3 44 57 
4 40 60 
5 42 53 
Aug. 1 41 51 
2 43 49 
3 47 49 
4 43 50 
Sept. 1 43 43 
2 41 49 
3 37 40 
4 37 47 
5 33 55 
Oct. 1 40 53 
2 35 51 
3 33 46 
4 33 42 
Nov. 1 32 42 
2 32 40 
3 24 24 
4 21 
__ b 
1977: June 5 44 73 
July 1 50 75 
2 50 57 
3 50 58 
4 51 58 
Aug. 1 53 58 
2 53 63 
3 52 56 
4 48 51 
~ew crop basis figures were obtained from Robert N. Wisner , 
Craig A. Chase, and H. Alan Carver, Basis Patterns for Corn and Soy-
beans, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, Cooperative Extension 
Service, M-1213, May 1980. 
b 
Current year November futures contracts have expired prior to 
this time. 
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Table 6-1. (Continued) 
Month Corn Soybeans 
Year and week (Dec. basis) (Nov . basis) 
1977: Sept. 1 50 54 
2 48 54 
3 49 53 
4 61 50 
5 57 51 
Oct. 1 57 52 
2 56 53 
3 52 51 
4 49 46 
Nov. 1 44 43 
2 44 45 
3 37 35 
4 35 __ b 
1978: Apr. 1 47 60 
2 51 58 
3 51 56 
4 48 55 
May 1 47 53 
2 48 54 
3 47 54 
4 47 53 
June 1 49 52 
2 50 54 
3 47 54 
4 46 49 
5 45 53 
July 1 49 54 
2 48 53 
3 48 54 
4 48 54 
Aug. 1 47 56 
2 50 59 
3 47 55 
4 46 56 
5 45 56 
Sept. 1 46 59 
2 46 57 
3 49 53 
4 50 61 
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Table 6-1. (Continued) 
Month Corn Soybeans 
Year and week (Dec. basis) (Nov. basis) 
1978: Oct. 1 46 60 
2 52 60 
3 49 63 
4 52 64 
Nov. 1 48 65 
2 48 56 
3 45 48 
4 43 
__ b 
5 42 __ b 
1979: Apr. 3 53 63 
4 50 64 
May 1 48 63 
2 50 64 
3 50 64 
4 51 60 
5 50 63 
June 1 48 59 
2 54 65 
3 53 66 
4 51 80 
July 1 50 66 
2 53 70 
3 56 67 
4 55 61 
Aug. 1 55 62 
2 56 66 
3 57 66 
4 64 66 
5 65 67 
Sept. 1 63 69 
2 62 65 
3 64 72 
4 67 74 
Oct. 1 68 80 
2 70 87 
3 68 82 
4 67 81 
Nov. 1 60 76 
2 55 66 
3 63 60 
4 61 __ b 
5 58 b 
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Table 6-2. Weekly Southeast Iowa new crop bas is, 1976-798 
Month Corn Soybean 
Year and week (Dec. basis) (Nov. basis) 
1976: July 1 46 51 
2 40 47 
3 41 44 
4 40 42 
5 40 42 
Aug . 1 39 44 
2 40 45 
3 37 45 
4 41 45 
Sept. 1 39 42 
2 41 44 
3 49 32 
4 39 47 
5 37 48 
Oct. 1 35 43 
2 38 40 
3 38 42 
4 38 39 
Nov. 1 36 31 
2 44 46 
3 28 24b 
4 22 
1977: June 5 43 83 
July 1 41 40 
2 37 41 
3 41 45 
4 40 44 
Aug. 1 41 44 
2 40 49 
3 38 38 
4 39 44 
~ew crop basis figures were obtained from Robert N. Wisner, 
Craig A. Chase, and H. Alan Carver, Basis Patterns for Corn and Soy-
beans, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, Cooperative Extension 
Service, M-1210, May 1980. 
bCurrent year November f utures contracts have expired prior to 
this time. 
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Table 6-2. (Continued) 
Month Corn Soybeans 
Year and week (Dec. basis) (Nov. basis) 
1977: Sept. 1 37 44 
2 43 35 
3 46 50 
4 46 36 
5 47 46 
Oct. 1 44 44 
2 44 46 
3 40 45 
4 30 36 
Nov. 1 23 31 
2 21 29 
3 22 21 
4 21 
__ b 
1978: Apr. 1 39 43 
2 35 39 
3 40 42 
4 34 38 
May 1 37 44 
2 36 42 
3 35 38 
4 36 59 
June 1 35 41 
2 35 40 
3 37 39 
4 34 39 
5 34 38 
July 1 37 33 
2 36 40 
3 37 39 
4 33 39 
Aug. 1 37 42 
2 41 40 
3 35 40 
4 34 39 
5 33 39 
Sept. 1 34 40 
2 35 38 
3 31 29 
4 35 39 
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Table 6-2. (Continued) 
Month Corn Soybeans 
Year and week (Dec . basis) (Nov. basis) 
1978: Oct. 1 34 40 
2 38 39 
3 37 40 
4 33 42 
Nov. 1 33 41 
2 27 35 
3 24 29 
4 13 --b 
5 17 --b 
1979 : Apr. 3 39 49 
4 39 46 
May 1 37 45 
2 37 47 
3 35 42 
4 38 45 
5 35 42 
June 1 38 46 
2 39 43 
3 38 48 
4 31 72 
July 1 32 49 
2 38 52 
3 41 51 
4 37 52 
Aug. 1 41 47 
2 41 52 
3 42 51 
4 41 51 
5 41 56 
Sept. 1 40 50 
2 40 45 
3 43 56 
4 43 52 
Oct. 1 40 56 
2 39 69 
3 46 79 
4 50 78 
Nov. 1 51 74 
2 45 59 
3 51 52 
4 49 --b 
5 43 
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price obtained through hedging in the futures market . One exception 
was in early June with hedged prices reflecting a four year average 
whereas contracted prices were determined by using a two year average . 
Thus, these results are not directly comparable. The reason for the 
two year contracting average is that in 1976 and 1977 new crop bids 
were first reported beginning in the last week of June. Early June 
contracting prices thus were not available for the two earlier years. 
Hedging returns shown here are net returns after deducting hedging 
costs of 2 and 4 cents per bushel respectively for corn and soybeans. 
Hedging prices were generally above prices received from forward 
contracting during the first three years of the period under study for 
Southeast Iowa, whereas the prices received from the two alternatives 
in Northwest Iowa were nearly identical . In 1979, the opposite pattern 
occurred, with forward contracting receiving a 4 to 20 cent per bushel 
advantage over hedging. Likely reasons for the advantage of contracting 
in 1979 were the Rock Island railroad strike during early fall and 
larger than expected corn and soybean crops. These conditions produced 
a larger than normal basis at harvest which was not anticipated when 
forward contracts were issued in early spring and sununer. The result 
was that forward contracts offered unusually attractive pricing 
opportunities in the spring and early stumner, relative to other market 
alternatives. 
Elevator contracting or new crop hedging in early June and mid-July 
would have provided higher prices than harvest-time cash bids for each 
of the four study years. For example, in Northwest Iowa hedging and 
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contracting held a 3 to 51 cents per bushel advantage over harvest-
time prices while an advantage of 3 to 49 cents occurred in South-
eastern Iowa . 
Mid-August and mid-September results from new crop pricing show 
a slight and moderate price advantage over harvest-time prices 
respectively during 1976 and 1979. These alternatives provided a 
moderate disadvantage during 1977 and 1978 in both districts. Whether 
or not similar monthly price patterns occur in future years depends 
upon the level of carryover stocks and on crop prospects during the 
summer. 
Variation in corn prices 
The variation in returns from hedging and forward contracting in 
early June was lower than in the corresponding prices received during 
harvest-time. For example, Northwest Iowa harvest prices ranged from 
$1.68 to $2.24 over the 1976-79 period, while preharvest hedging and 
forward contracting prices ranged from $2.05 to $2.39 and $2.20 to 
$2.32 respectively for the same period . Thus, early June preharvest 
hedges and forward contracts not only were less variable, but also 
offered a higher average return than harvest sales. 
Hedging or contracting during the past four years in mid-July, mid-
August, or mid-September resulted in substantially higher variation in 
prices than harvest sales. For instance, harvest time prices in North-
west Iowa varied by 56 cents per bushel over this period, while 
contracts and hedges provided a price range of 73 cents and 110 cents, 
respectively. Thus, hedging or contracting initiated early in the 
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growing season resulted in increased average prices and decreased 
variability in prices over those received at harvest . These advantages, 
however, decreased substantially as the pricing decision was delayed 
until later in the growing season. 
New Crop Soybean Pricing Results 
Results from forward contracting, preharvest hedging, and harvest-
time soybean sales are shown in Tables 6-5 and 6-6. Note that for all 
four alternatives, average forward contracting prices were above the 
prices received from hedging by 5 to 13 cents per bushel . 
Looking at the individual years, forward contracting and hedging 
returns were nearly identical in 1976 in Northwest Iowa. However, as 
the study period progressed from 1977 to 1979, forward contr acting ' s 
advantage moderately i ncreased. In Southeast Iowa, hedging and 
contracting prices were nearly identical in 1976 with hedging returns 
receiving a 3 to 6 cents per bushel advantage over contracting in 1977. 
The opposite occurred in 1978 and 1979 with forward contracting 
providing an advantage for all four marketing alternatives. 
During early summer and mid-September, hedging or contracting 
would have given the producer moderately higher returns than harvest-
time sales . The opposite would have occurred in mid-August, with 
harvest-time sales having a slight advantage over hedgi ng or cont r acting. 
Variation in soybean pr i ces 
Comparing the year-to-year variation in hedging and contracting 
prices, hedging result s in early summer were more variable than the 
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corresponding forward contracting results. During mid-August, the 
opposite occurred with hedging returns being moderately less variable 
than those for forward contracting. The mid-September comparisons 
reveal that returns from the two marketing alternatives were nearly 
identical in degree of price variation. 
When comparing year-to-year variation of contracting and hedging 
returns to harvest-time sales, hedging in mid-July and mid-August for 
both Northwest and Southeast Iowa would have reduced variability over 
the returns received at harvest-time. However, increased variation 
would have occurred in early June and mid-September hedging alterna-
tives compared to harvest-time sales. 
In Southeast Iowa, forward contracting in early June and mid-July 
would have reduced year-to-year variations in returns, with mid-August 
results being nearly identical to harvest-time sales and mid-September 
results showing increasing variability. In Northwest Iowa, contracting 
would have reduced variability in early June and mid-July while 
increased variability occurred during mid-August and mid-September 
marketing times. 
Whether these patterns continue depends upon sununer weather 
conditions and crop prospects. For example, if the growing season 
looks favorable, the monthly patterns of new-crop prices will likely 
continue to be similar to the average pattern shown in this analysis 
for the past four years. If growing conditions are adverse, the late 
summer and early fall forward prices could be more attractive than 
those available in June and July. 
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It is important to note that other factors such as local supply, 
demand and transportation capabilities also will affect prices received 
at harvest. For instance, if a serious rail car shortage exists, the 
local basis will likely become wider than normal and will tend to 
reduce the net return to the producer from both pre-harvest hedging 
and harvest sales. However, if the local demand exceeds the local 
supply, the basis will narrow and return more to the producer through 
hedging than normally would be expected. 
Timing also is essential to maximizing profits. For example, the 
producer should be alert to weather patterns across the grain belt in 
any given year and normal seasonal price patterns in deciding when to 
enter into a forward contract or to place a hedge. 
Role of New Crop Pricing in Corn and Soybeans 
New crop pricing offered a potentially important role for producers 
in marketing corn and soybeans during the 1974-79 period. For corn, 
hedging or contracting initiated in early June and mid-July resulted 
in increased prices over those received at harvest during all four years 
of the study period. As the growing season progressed until after mid-
summer, the results became mixed with hedging and contracting prices 
larger or smaller than the corresponding average harvest prices, 
depending upon local and national market conditions. 
Variability of prices in early June were lower than the corre-
sponding range of harvest prices . However, from mid-July through the 
harvest period increased variability occurred, possibly limiting some 
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farm operators with limited risk-bearing ability from using these 
techniques. 
New crop pricing of soybeans in early June, mid-July, and mid-
September would have provided average returns above prices received 
at harvest. However, mid-August returns averaged slightly lower. 
Year-to-year variability of forward contracting returns increased 
moderately as the growing season progressed and the pricing decision 
was delayed. Hedging returns decreased moderately from early-June to 
mid-August, then increased substantially in mid-September. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of this thesis and highlights 
the important results and implications of the marketing alternatives 
studied. 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Overview 
The main objectives of the thesis were: (1) to assist Iowa 
producers in more effectively marketing corn and soybeans by analyzing 
four marketing alternatives available to them; (2) to compare the 
returns available to producers in the Northwest and Southeast price 
reporting districts from using these marketing alternatives; and 
(3) to examine the behavior of Chicago corn and soybean futures 
markets as contract expiration is approached. The four marketing 
alternatives examined here were: cash sale at harvest, forward 
contracting through a local elevator for delivery at harvest, use of 
futures markets to establish prices for harvest and post-harvest 
delivery, and storage of the crop beyond harvest without forward 
pricing. 
Transportation and market conditions were expected to cause 
important differences between the cash-futures price relationships 
of the two price reporting districts. These differences were 
believed likely to affect the net returns available from various 
marketing alternatives . Conditions in the Chicago markets also may 
influence local basis patterns and returns to producers from various 
forward pricing alternatives at certain times. 
Spatial Price Relationships and Delivery Conditions 
Regional price differentials for grains and oilseeds reflect a 
pricing system that takes into account transfer costs. In the case 
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of corn and soybeans, Chicago is the par delivery point for corn and 
soybean futures contracts and forms a common reference point from 
which local prices can be related. Delivery or potential delivery 
on futures contracts is an important mechanism which holds local cash 
prices in a predictable relationship to Chicago. In analyzing 
district price differences, it was found that under normal conditions, 
delivery on CBOT or MAE corn and soybean futures contracts at Chicago 
would be more economical than delivery to either St. Louis (corn only) 
or Toledo, Ohio. Also, rail delivery was found to be more economical 
than truck delivery. 
In analyzing the effectiveness of the delivery mechanism, the 
weekly Northwest and Southeast Iowa corn and soybean basis for the 
1974-79 period was compared with the corresponding cost of delivery 
on Chicago futures contracts (on delivery cost basis). At no time in 
either district did the average actual corn basis under expiring 
futures contracts during the futures delivery month exceed the 
delivery cost basis. In fact, the corn basis generally was smaller 
than would be expected from examining delivery costs. In soybeans, 
however, in August and November 1974 and in May 1978 the average 
soybean basis did modestly exceed the average delivery cost basis. 
These results indicate that in essentially all cases, there was no 
incentive for a hedger to deliver corn from Northwest and Southeast 
Iowa on futures contracts. However, on a few occasions, incentives 
for delivery of Iowa soybeans on futures contracts did briefly occur. 
But in these instances and with a volatile soybean basis, delivery 
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could have been accomplished more effectively by firms owning soybeans 
in Chicago than by Iowa hedgers. Based on these findings, it is 
concluded that delivery costs do set a lower limit on corn and in 
most cases, on the Iowa soybean basis. 
Chicago Basis as an Indicator of Delivery Conditions 
Chicago basis patterns were examined to determine if delivery 
conditions have at times contributed to erratic basis behavior in 
Iowa as futures contracts expire. If delivery on futures contracts 
is possible or the threat of delivery is effective, one would expect 
the Chicago basis to be relatively stable and predictable as contract 
maturity approaches. Chicago cash prices should differ from the 
price of the expiring futures contract for the same commodity by no 
more than the costs of delivery, except for brief periods. If no 
impediments to deliver exist, Chicago cash prices should range above 
and below expiring futures quotations with about equal frequency. One 
would also expect the variability of the Chicago basis against expiring 
futures contracts should gradually diminish during the final weeks 
of trading as the futures contract expiration date is reached. 
If delivery problems occur, the Chicago basis could become wide 
and unpredictable causing the local basis in Iowa and other areas to 
become distorted and wider than normal. This unpredictability would 
make soybean hedging returns for producers more variable than corn 
and would likely be compensated for by widening merchandising margins 
in the grain trade. 
In this analysis, no evidence of serious impediments to delivery 
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on corn futures contracts was found. However, soybean basis behavior 
under expiring futures contracts has been much more erratic than on 
corn futures. In several instances, the soybean basis at contract 
expiration was wider than corresponding delivery costs. The soybean 
basis also tended to exhibit a downward bias rather than a distribution 
above and below futures prices with equal frequency . In each case 
where the Iowa soybean basis exceeded delivery costs, the Chicago basis 
also exceeded its corresponding delivery costs. These findings 
suggest impediments to delivery on futures contracts at times may 
have contributed to a wider than normal Iowa soybean basis. 
Role of Storage Hedges 
Hedging offered a potentially important role for Northwest and 
Southeast Iowa producers in marketing stored corn during the past six 
years. This marketing alternative would have generated increased 
returns and decreased variation in returns compared to unhedged 
storage for eight months beyond harvest. Hedging offered a less 
important potential role in marketing soybeans. In this case, returns 
in several instances were less than those from unhedged storage. How-
ever, the variation in hedging returns was substantially less than in 
unhedged storage and could be an important consideration for farm 
operators with limited financial risk-bearing ability. Hedging returns 
generally would not have covered the full off-farm costs of storing 
corn and soybeans for the time periods studied here. However, 
hedging more than covered variable costs of on-farm storage in most 
instances for corn and soybeans during the three month storage period. 
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New Crop Pricing Methods 
Returns from forward contracting and preharvest hedging for 
harvest delivery during early June, mid-July, mid-August, and mid-
September were compared to the average harvest prices received for 
the period 1976-79 for Northwest and Southeast Iowa. From this 
analysis, it was shown that new crop pricing offered a potentially 
important role for producers in marketing corn and soybeans during 
the study period. For corn, hedging or contracting in early June 
and mid-July for harvest delivery averaged about 25 cents above the 
returns received at harvest during all four years of the study period . 
As the growing season progressed beyond mid-summer, the results 
became more variable with hedging and contracting prices being either 
side of the corresponding average harvest prices, depending upon 
local and national market conditions . During the study period, average 
contracting prices were below hedging returns by 1 to 3 cents per 
bushel. 
Variation in new crop prices in early June was lower then the 
corres ponding range of harvest pri ces . However, from mid-July through 
the harvest period, new-crop prices became more variable. Increased 
variability might discourage some farm operators with limited 
financial risk-bearing ability from using these techniques routinely . 
Routine new-crop pricing of soybeans in early June, mid-July, and 
mid-September would have provided average returns above those received 
from harvest sales. However, mid-August returns averaged slightly 
lower than harvest-time prices. The highest average returns occurred 
• 
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during early June and mid-July and averaged about 60 cents above the 
returns received at harvest. During the study period, average 
contracting prices were above hedging returns by 5 to 24 cents per 
bushel. 
Year-to-year variation in soybean contracting returns increased 
moderately as the growing season progressed . Hedging returns decreased 
moderately from early-June to mid-August, then increased substantially 
in mid-September. 
Concluding Remarks 
Basis information is an important requirement for producers in 
choosing between hedging and contracting alternatives and in deciding 
when to place and lift storage hedges. Cash grain producers who 
are using these tools need to maintain and continuously update their 
records of local basis patterns for effective marketing. During the 
study period, the local basis for Northwest and Southeast Iowa has 
approximately doubled due to inflation in grain transportation and 
marketing costs. Cash grain producers also need to be aware of local 
supply, demand, and transportation conditions causing basis patterns 
to vary. 
Hedging and contracting are important tools that can aid producers 
in risk management. However, for effective marketing these tools 
require continual analyses of market conditions and awareness of 
seasonal price tendencies. 
The study also shows evidence of less than ideal basis behavior 
in the Chicago soybean market. Chicago basis behavior on soybeans is 
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related partly to limit price moves that sometimes occur in futures 
markets and tendencies for traders to take "price protection" at such 
t imes. Erratic basis behavior also can be related partly to low 
soybean stocks available for delivery in Chicago. However, these 
conditions do not appear to be complete explanations of the tendency 
toward wide and erratic Chicago soybean basis as futures contracts 
approach maturity. 
The effect upon the Chicago soybean basis from adding Toledo, 
Ohio as an additional delivery point in September 1979 is not yet 
known. More time is needed before this affec t can be analyzed. This 
author suggests a need for regulatory agencies such as the CFTC to 
monitor Chicago soybean basis during contract expiration to determine 
whether the Toledo delivery point is leading to less variability in 
bean basis patterns. 
137 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Arthur, Henry B. Commodity Futures as a Business Management Tool. 
Boston: Harvard University, 1971. 
Book of Grain Rates No. 16 West of the Mississippi. Chicago : Chicago 
Board of Trade Transportation Department, January 2, 1976, and 
updated. 
Breimyer, Harold F. Economics of the Product Markets of Agricult ure. 
Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1976. 
Brennan, Michael J. "The Supply of Storage." The American Economic 
Review 48, No. 1 (March 1958):50-72. 
Callahan, Steve A. "Grain Merchandising and Futures Markets in 
Kentucky." University of Kentucky Cooperative Extension 
Service Series No. 7, March 1972. 
Carver, H. Alan. "Analysis of Corn and Soybean Cash-Futures Price 
Relationships in North Central Iowa." Master of Science t hesis, 
Iowa State University, 1978. 
Cundiff, Edward W., and Still, Richard R. Basic Marketing . 2nd ed. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971. 
Dahl, Raymond and Henneberry, Patrick. "Cash-Futures Price Relation-
ships - Guides to Grain Marketing." University of Minneso t a 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 517-1977, 1977. 
Heifner, Richard G. "Report on a Study of the March 1979 Chicago 
Wheat Futures Contract." Unpublished paper by the Agricultural 
Market Service of the U. S. Department of Agriculture sponsored 
by the Ninety-Sixth Congress of the United States . 
Hieronymus, T. A. "When to Sell Corn, Soybeans, Oats, and Wheat . " 
Illinois Cooperative Extension Service, Circular 833, October 1966. 
Hieronymus, Thomas A. Economics of Futures Trading. New York: 
Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., 1971. 
Hoffman, G. Wright. Future Trading Upon Organized Commodity Markets 
in the United States. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1932. 
Kaldor, Nicholas. "Speculation and Economic Stability." Review of 
Economic Studies 7 (1939-40):1-27. 
138 
Knutson, Ronald D.; Barr, Wallace; and Black, William E. "Who Will 
Market Your Products?" Texas Agricultural Extension Service, 
D-1053, March 1978. 
MidAmerica Commodity Exchange Rules . Chicago: Mid.America Commodity 
Exchange, May 1976. 
Morrow, Al. "Understanding Basis Sharpens Your Grain Marketing Skill." 
Wallaces Farmer, 101, No. 21 (November 1976):16. 
Rules and Regulations Board of Trade of the City of Chicago. Chicago: 
Chicago Board of Trade, September 1, 1977. 
Shepherd, Geoffrey S. Agricultural Price Analysis. 3rd ed. Ames: 
Iowa State College Press, 1950. 
Sogn, Arthur B. "Farmers Use of Grain Futures." South Dakota Agri-
cultural Experiment Station Bulletin 590, November 1971. 
Sogn, Arthur B., and Rudel, Richard K., eds. "Marketing Alternatives 
for Producers of Wheat." Agricultural Information Office, South 
Dakota State University, Brookings, South Dakota, 1973. 
Statistical Annual Chicago Board of Trade. Chicago: Board of Trade 
of the City of Chicago, 1974 and 1975. 
Tomek, William G., and Robinson, Kenneth L. Agricultural Product 
Prices. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. 
Wall Street Journal. 1 January 1976 - 31 December 1979. 
Wisner, Robert N. "Using Grain Futures in the Farm Business." Iowa 
State Cooperative Extension Service, Pm-687, March 1976. 
Wisner, Robert N. "Effects of CCC Stocks on the Cash-Future Price 
Spreads for Corn." Master of Science thesis, Michigan State 
University, 1963. 
Wisner, Robert N., and Skadberg, J. Marvin. "A Proposal for Multiple 
Corn and Soybean Futures Delivery Points." Iowa State Cooperative 
Extension Service, M-1068, August 1973. 
Wisner, Robert N.; Baumel, C. Phillip; and Wallize, John A. "An 
Analysis of Deferred Grain Pricing Contracts." Journal of American 
Society of Farm Managers and Appraisers 39, No. 2 (October 1975): 
9-13. 
Wisner, Robert N.; Baumel, C. Phillip; and Wallize, John A. "New Way 
to Sell Corn: How it Worked." Wallaces Farmer 100, No. 7 
(April 1975):76-77. 
139a 
Wisner, Robert N.; Baumel, C. Phillip; and Wallize, John A. "Deferred 
Grain Pricing: A Look at How it Works." Feedstuffs 47, No. 10 
(March 1975):26. 
Wisner, Robert N.; Chase, Craig A.; and Carver, H. Alan. "Analysis of 
Corn and Soybean Basis Patterns and Hedging Opportunities for 
Cash-Grain Producers by Price Reporting Districts in Iowa." 
Report sponsored jeintly by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and 
the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa, May 1980 . 
• 
Wisner, Robert N.; Chase, Craig A.; and Carver, H. Alan. Basis 
Patterns for Corn and Soybeans. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa , 
Cooperative Extension Service, M-1210 through M-1215, May 1980. 
Working, Holbrook. "Hedging Reconsidered . " Journal of Farm Economics 
35, No. 4 (November 1953):544-61. 
Working, Holbrook. "Theory of the Inverse Carrying Charge in Futures 
Markets." Journal of Farm Economics 30, No. 1 (February 1948): 
1-28. 
Working, Holbrook. "The Theory of Price of Storage." American Economic 
Review 39, No. 6 (December 1949):1254-62. 
139b 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It is the author's intention to pay special tribute to those who 
contributed to the completion of the thesis. 
First, I wish to thank Dr. Robert N. Wisner for his aid in gaining 
an understanding of grain marketing procedures and his encouragement 
throughout the completion of the thesis. Dr. Roy D. Hickman also 
had helpful suggestions concerning statistical methods. 
The author would like to thank the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation 
and the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station for financial support, 
which enabled graduate study to be possible at this time. 
A special thanks to Shirley Baum for her expertise in typing 
and aid in putting the thesis in final form . 
Last, but not least, the author would like to thank his parents, 
for without their patience, understanding, and support, the thesis 
could not have been completed. 
V XICIN:iclcIV 
O'lt 
A
pp
en
di
x 
T
ab
le
 A
-1
. 
E
st
im
at
ed
 c
o
st
s 
fo
r 
d
e
li
v
e
ry
 
o
f 
co
rn
 a
n
d
 
so
y
b
ea
n
s 
by
 r
a
il
 
fr
om
 N
o
rt
h
w
es
t 
Io
w
a 
to
 a
p
p
ro
v
ed
 
fu
tu
re
s 
d
e
li
v
e
ry
 e
le
v
a
to
rs
 
in
 
C
h
ic
ag
o
, 
m
id
-1
97
4 
th
ro
ug
h 
m
id
-1
97
6 
in
 c
e
n
ts
 p
e
r 
b
u
sh
el
 
O
ri
g
in
 
T
im
e 
in
te
rv
a
l 
D
en
is
on
 
m
id
-1
9
74
 
S
io
u
x
 C
it
y
 
S
p
en
ce
r 
D
en
is
o
n
 
m
id
-1
97
5 
S
io
u
x
 C
it
y
 
S
p
en
ce
r 
D
en
is
o
n
 
m
id
-1
97
6 
S
io
u
x
 C
it
y
 
S
p
en
ce
r 
C
or
n 
S
to
ra
g
e 
M
er
ch
an
-
S
in
g
le
 E
le
v
a
to
r 
an
d 
In
te
re
st
 d
is
in
g
 
c
a
r8
 
ch
ar
g
es
b
 
in
su
r.
b 
on
 
cr
o
p
 
m
ar
g
in
c 
2
6
.3
 
3
3
.3
 
2
5
.8
 
2
9
.7
 
3
7
.2
 
2
9
.1
 
3
0
.5
 
3
8
.1
 
29
.7
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
0
.3
 
0
.3
 
0
.3
 
0
.4
 
0
.4
 
0
,4
 
0
.4
 
0
.4
 
0
.4
 
1
.0
 
J .
• 0
 
1
.0
 
0
.9
 
0
.9
 
0
.9
 
0
.9
 
0
.9
 
0
.9
 
4
.0
 
4
,0
 
4
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
T
o
ta
l 
S
in
g
le
 E
le
v
at
o
r 
co
s
ts
 
ca
r3
 
ch
ar
g
es
b 
3
5
.6
 
4?
.. 
6 
3
5
.1
 
4
0
.0
 
4
7
.5
 
39
.4
 
4
1
.8
 
4
9
.4
 
4
1
.0
 
3
5
.7
 
3
5
.7
 
35
.7
 
39
.9
 
3
9
.9
 
3
9
.9
 
40
.8
 
4
0
.8
 
4
0
.8
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
4
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
5
.0
 
S
oy
be
an
 
S
to
ra
g
e 
an
d 
in
su
r.
b 
0
.3
 
0
.3
 
0
.3
 
0
.4
 
0
.4
 
0
.4
 
0
,4
 
0
.4
 
0
.4
 
M
er
ch
an
-
In
te
re
st
 d
is
in
g
 T
o
ta
l 
on
 
cr
o
p
 
m
ar
g
in
C
co
st
s 
2
.1
 
2
.1
 
2
.1
 
1
. 7
 
1
. 7
 
1
. 7
 
2
.8
 
2
,8
 
2
.8
 
6
.0
 
6
.0
 
6
.0
 
7
.0
 
7
.0
 
7
.0
 
8
.0
 
8
.0
 
8
.0
 
4
8
.1
 
4
8
.1
 
4
8
.1
 
53
.0
 
5
3
.0
 
5
3
.0
 
5
7
 .o
 
57
.0
 
5
7
.0
 
a 
O
b
ta
in
ed
 f
ro
m
 B
oo
k 
o
f 
G
ra
in
 R
at
es
 N
o
. 
16
 W
es
t 
o
f 
th
e
 M
is
si
ss
ip
p
i 
(C
h
ic
ag
o
: 
C
hi
ca
go
 
B
oa
rd
 
o
f 
T
ra
d
e 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
 D
e
p
t.
, 
Ja
n
u
ar
y
 
2
, 
19
76
 a
nd
 
u
p
d
at
ed
.)
 
b 
O
b
ta
in
ed
 
fr
om
 p
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 w
it
h
 g
ra
in
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 o
ff
ic
ia
ls
 i
n
 C
h
ic
ag
o
. 
c A
ss
um
ed
 
m
ar
g
in
 
to
 
co
v
er
 o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 c
o
st
s 
a
t 
co
u
n
tr
y
 e
le
v
a
to
rs
, 
A
ct
u
al
 m
ar
g
in
s 
w
il
l 
v
ar
y
 f
r
om
 
ti
m
e 
to
 
ti
m
e 
an
d
 
o
n
e 
a
re
a
 
to
 a
n
o
th
e
r,
 
d
ep
en
d
in
g
 o
n 
m
ar
k
et
 
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s.
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
T
ab
le
 A
-2
. 
E
st
im
at
ed
 c
o
st
s 
fo
r 
d
e
li
v
e
ry
 o
f 
co
rn
 a
nd
 
so
y
b
ea
n
s 
by
 
ra
il
 
fr
om
 
S
o
u
th
ea
st
 
Io
w
a 
to
 a
p
p
ro
v
ed
 
fu
tu
re
s 
d
e
li
v
e
ry
 e
le
v
a
to
rs
 i
n
 C
h
ic
ag
o
, 
m
id
-1
97
4 
th
ro
u
g
h
 m
id
-1
97
6 
in
 c
e
n
ts
 p
e
r 
b
u
sh
el
 
C
or
n 
So
:z
'.b
ea
n 
S
to
ra
g
e 
M
er
ch
an
-
S
to
ra
g
e 
M
er
ch
an
-
T
im
e 
S
in
g
le
 E
le
v
at
o
r 
an
d 
In
te
re
st
 d
i s
in
g
 
T
o
ta
l 
S
in
g
le
 E
le
v
at
o
r 
an
d
 
In
te
re
st
 d
is
in
g
 
T
o
ta
l 
O
ri
g
in
 
in
te
rv
a
l 
ca
ra
 
ch
ar
g
es
b
 i
n
su
r,
b
 o
n
 c
ro
e 
m
ar
g
in
c 
c
o
st
s 
c
a
r8
 
ch
ar
g
es
b
 
in
su
r.
b 
on
 
cr
o
e 
m
ar
gi
nc
 
c
o
st
s 
B
u
rl
in
g
to
n
 m
id
-1
97
4 
2
1
.6
 
4
.0
 
0
.3
 
1
.0
 
4
.0
 
3
0
.9
 
25
.8
 
4
.0
 
0
.3
 
2
.1
 
6
.0
 
3
8
.2
 
D
av
en
p
o
rt
 
1
7
.9
 
4
.0
 
0
.3
 
1
.0
 
4
.0
 
2
7
.2
 
2
2
.2
 
4
.0
 
0
.3
 
2
.1
 
6
.0
 
3
4
.6
 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
2
0
.2
 
4
.0
 
0
.3
 
1
.0
 
4
.0
 
2
9
.5
 
2
7
.6
 
4
.0
 
0
.3
 
2
.1
 
6
.0
 
4
0
.0
 
B
u
rl
in
g
to
n
 m
id
-1
97
5 
2
4
.1
 
4
.0
 
0
.4
 
0
.9
 
5
.0
 
34
.4
 
2
9
.1
 
4
.0
 
0
.4
 
1
. 7
 
7
.0
 
4
2
.2
 
D
av
en
p
o
rt
 
20
.2
 
4
.0
 
0
.4
 
0
.9
 
5
.0
 
30
.5
 
2
4
.9
 
4
.0
 
0
.4
 
1
. 7
 
7
.0
 
3
8
.0
 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
2
2
.7
 
4
.0
 
0
.4
 
0
.9
 
5
.0
 
33
.0
 
3
1
.2
 
4
.0
 
0
.4
 
1
. 7
 
7
.0
 
44
.3
 
B
ur
li
n
g
to
n
 m
id
-1
97
6 
24
.7
 
5
.0
 
0
.4
 
0
.9
 
5
.0
 
3
6
.0
 
2
9
.7
 
5
.0
 
0
.4
 
2
.8
 
8
.o
 
4
5
.9
 
D
av
en
p
o
rt
 
2
0
.7
 
5
.0
 
0
.4
 
0
.9
 
5
.0
 
3
2
.0
 
2
5
.5
 
5
.0
 
0
.4
 
2
.8
 
8
.0
 
4
1
. 7
 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
23
.2
 
5
.0
 
0
,4
 
0
.9
 
5
.0
 
34
.5
 
3
2
.1
 
5
.0
 
0
.4
 
2
.8
 
8
.0
 
4
8
.3
 
aO
b
ta
in
ed
 
fr
om
 
B
oo
k 
o
f 
G
ra
in
 R
at
es
 N
o.
 
1
6
 W
es
t 
o
f 
th
e 
M
1
ss
is
si
2
2
i 
(C
h
ic
ag
o
: 
C
hi
ca
go
 B
oa
rd
 o
f 
T
ra
d
e 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
 D
e
p
t.
, 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
2
, 
19
76
 a
nd
 u
p
d
a
te
d
,)
 
bO
bt
ai
ne
d 
fr
om
 p
er
so
n
al
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
it
h
 g
ra
in
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 o
ff
ic
ia
ls
 i
n
 C
hi
ca
go
. 
c A
ss
um
ed
 
m
ar
g
in
 
to
 
co
v
er
 o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 c
o
st
s 
a
t 
co
u
n
tr
y
 e
le
v
a
to
rs
. 
A
ct
u
al
 m
ar
g
in
s 
w
il
l 
v
ar
y
 f
ro
m
 
ti
m
e 
to
 
ti
m
e 
an
d
 o
n
e 
ar
ea
 
to
 a
n
o
th
er
, 
d
ep
en
d
in
g
 o
n 
m
ar
k
et
 
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s.
 
.....
. 
~
 
l'.
J 
Appendix Table A-3. Estimated costs for delivery of corn and soybeans 
by truck from Northwest Iowa to approved futures 
delivery elevators in Chicago, mid-1974 through 
mid-1976 in cents per bushel 
Corn 
Trans- Storage Merchan-
Time porta- Transit Elevator and Interest dising Total 
billingbchargesc margind Origin interval tiona insur.con crop costs 
Denison mid-1974 27.0 11.0 4.0 0.3 1.0 4.0 47.3 
Sioux City 
Spencer 
Denison mid-1975 28.0 13.0 4.0 0.4 0.9 5.0 51.3 
Sioux City 
Spencer 
Denison mid-1976 29.0 14.0 5.0 0.4 0.9 5.0 54.3 
Sioux City 
Spencer 
aObtained from personal coaununication with trucking officials in 
Iowa. 
bObtained from personal communication with Frank Polem, Chicago 
Board of Trade Transportation Specialist. Calculation is discussed in 
Chapter 3 of the text. 
cObtained from personal communication with grain industry officials 
in Chicago. 
d Assumed margin to cover operating costs at country elevators. 
Actual margins will vary from time to time and one area to another, 
depending on market conditions. 
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Solbeans 
Merchan-
Transpor- Transit Elevator Storage Interest di s i ng Total 
tationa billingb chargesc & insur . c on crop margind costs 
27 . 0 12.0 4.0 0.3 2.1 6. 0 51.4 
28.0 14.0 4.0 0.4 1. 7 7. 0 55 . 1 
29.0 15.0 5.0 0.4 2.8 8 . 0 60.2 
Appendix Table A-4. Estimated costs for delivery of corn and soybeans 
by truck from Northwest Iowa to approved futures 
delivery elevators in Chicago, mid-1974 through 
mid-1976 in cents per bushel 
Corn 
Trans- Storage 
Origin 
Time 
interval 
porta- Transit Elevator and Interest 
tiona billingbchargesb insur.con crop 
Burlington mid-1974 27.0 
Davenport 
Washington 
Burlington mid-1975 28.0 
Davenport 
Washington 
Burlington mid-1976 29.0 
Davenport 
Washington 
11.0 
13.0 
14.0 
4.0 
4.0 
5.0 
0.3 1.0 
0. 4 0.9 
0.4 0.9 
Merchan-
dising d Total 
margin costs 
4 . 0 47.3 
5.0 51.3 
5.0 54.3 
a Obtained from personal communication with trucking officials in 
Iowa. 
b Obtained from personal communication 
Board of Trade Transportation Specialist. 
Chapter 3 of the text. 
with Frank Polem, Chicago 
Calculation is discussed in 
c Obtained from personal communication with grain industry officials 
in Chicago. 
dAssumed margin to cover operating costs at country elevators. 
Actual margins will vary from time to time and one area to another, 
depending on market conditions. 
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So:z:beans 
Merchan-
Transpor- Transit Elevator Storage & Interest di sing Total 
tationa billingh chargesC insurancec on crop margind costs 
27.0 12.0 4.0 0.3 2.1 6.0 51.4 
28.0 14.0 4.0 0.4 1. 7 7.0 55.1 
29.00 15.0 5.0 0.4 2.8 8.0 60.2 
' ' 
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